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This dissertation explores the role of informational frictions in macroeconomics
and highlights how these frictions influence micro-level decisions which, when ag-
gregated, result in more volatile macroeconomic fluctuations.
Chapter 1 explores the role of costly information and pricing complementarities
in explaining persistent effects of monetary policy and behavior of prices at the micro
level. In a setting where firms plan on when to acquire costly information, strategic
complementarities in pricing generates planning complementarities. This results
in a sluggish response of prices to monetary policy shocks. The calibrated model
matches frequent and large price changes along with substantial non-neutralities.
The chapter analyzes the effectiveness of monetary policy in the US since the 1970’s
and finds that it was relatively less effective in the 1970’s compared to the subsequent
decades.
Chapter 2 explores the role of dispersed opinions about economic conditions in
reinforcing economic fluctuations and the role of policy to curtail these fluctuations.
Output fluctuations arising from optimism and pessimism are often believed to be
inconsistent with rational expectations. I show that dispersed information together
with strategic complementarity, can give rise to endogenous cycles of pessimism
and optimism which amplify these fluctuations. In the model, agents try to infer
both true fundamentals and what others perceive the fundamentals of the econ-
omy to be, from both private signals and common prices. More precisely, agents
Forecast the forecasts of others. Correlated forecast errors mimic pessimism and
optimism. These endogenously generated correlated forecast errors interact with
production and investment decisions to cause volatile swings in both current and
future output. Three key results emerge. First, an economy with dispersed informa-
tion features amplified output fluctuations relative to the full information economy.
Importantly, prices reinforce sentiments which in turn generate more volatile and
persistent fluctuations. Second, in an otherwise neoclassical economy, dispersed in-
formation implies that the perception of aggregate demand matters in the output
decision of firms. Finally, these fluctuations are inefficient and aggregate demand
management through pro-cyclical payroll taxes or counter-cyclical sales subsidies
can be reduce volatility and improve welfare without the need for the policy maker
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Chapter 1: Costly Information, Planning Complementarities and the
Phillips Curve
1.1 Introduction
Price stickiness is often assumed in macroeconomic models as a way of gener-
ating a Phillips curve relationship, i.e. a positive relationship between inflation and
output in the short run. Previous literature, dating as far back as Phelps (1970)
and Lucas Jr. (1972), has stressed the importance of informational frictions to ex-
plain this relationship.1 More recently, the sticky information literature (Mankiw
and Reis, 2002; Reis, 2007), following Calvo (1983), the literature has assumed that
only a fraction of firms get endowed with up-to-date information exogenously every
period. As a result of this sticky information, only a fraction of firms have full in-
formation when making their pricing decision and this results in a delayed response
of prices to shocks.
Recent micro level pricing studies suggest that prices are not sticky. Bils and
Klenow (2004) and Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008) show that the median non-housing
1Other recent approaches to similar problems include work by Mackowiak and Wiederholt
(2009) who draw on the concept of Rational Inattention to explain the sluggish movement of prices.
Woodford (2002) shows how dispersed information can result in persistent effects of monetary
policy.
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consumer price changes once every 4.3 months. Conditional on a price change, the
mean size of a price change is large in absolute terms, at about 11 percent. However,
many macro level studies (Christiano et al., 1999; Uhlig, 2005) find support for a
role of sticky prices in the monetary transmission mechanism. Uhlig (2005) finds
that only about 25 percent of the long-run response of the U.S GDP price deflator
to a monetary policy shock occurs within the first year after the shock.
The sticky information approach, by exploiting dispersed information, squares
well with the macroeconomic evidence on the effects of nominal shocks but struggles
to explain frequently changing and volatile prices at the micro level as it assumes an
exogenous arrival rate of new information. In this paper, I present an endogenous
mechanism which is able to rationalize frequent and large price changes at the micro
level amid sluggish response in the aggregate price level to monetary shocks. The
driving force behind this mechanism centers around the strategic motives of firms
in choosing when to acquire new information. In the model, firms are allowed to
change prices at zero cost but face a positive cost in updating their information, as
in Reis (2007).
The basic mechanism can be summarized as follows. Strategic complementar-
ity in pricing results in a strategic complementarity in the decision about when to
acquire new information about the state of monetary policy, but not in the decision
to acquire information about idiosyncratic productivity. This complementarity in
planning results in a delay in the acquisition of information about monetary policy,
but not about idiosyncratic productivity.2
2This mechanism is distinct from the model of delay presented in Caballero (1999) which em-
2
When firm i gets new information about a positive nominal shock, its price
response is not only dependent on the true state of monetary policy, but is also
contingent on how other firms react to this nominal shock. If other firms do not
adjust their prices, then it is not optimal for firm i to unilaterally increase its price,
as relative prices matter for profit. In a symmetric staggered stationary equilibrium,
a firm that chooses to observe new information about a recent monetary shock, is
forced to temper its price changes to compensate for the large fraction of firms that
remain uninformed about this shock and whose prices therefre have not adjusted.
This, in turn, diminishes the benefit of obtaining information about the shock today,
as the firm will only find it optimal to fully act on this information in the future
when a majority of firms have updated their information. As the firm faces an
upfront cost of acquiring information today while the benefit is accrued only in the
future, the firm has an incentive to delay the acquisition of information.
In addition, strategic complementarity in planning reinforces this decision to
delay information acquisition about monetary policy. If all other firms update infor-
mation about the monetary state infrequently, then every firm has an incentive to
delay the acquisition of costly information about the monetary state. The aggregate
price moves sluggishly and does not track money supply well when a large mass of
firms remains uninformed. A sluggish aggregate price, together with pricing comple-
mentarity, imply that the difference between the firm’s current price and its target
price is small. Thus, the loss from remaining uninformed and mis-pricing is small.
Small losses from mis-pricing and delayed benefits from acquiring information give
phasizes information externalities in causing delay.
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rise to planning complementarities which in turn lead to delayed information acqui-
sition about the monetary state. Overall, prices increase less than proportionately
on impact after a monetary shock. Prices catch up eventually when all firms update
and incorporate the information about the monetary shock into their prices.
However, strategic complementarity in planning does not extend to a firm’s
decision to update its information about idiosyncratic productivity. A firm’s ben-
efit from being informed about their idiosyncratic state is not contingent on other
firms’ information about its individual productivity. Firms, thus optimally, update
information about their idiosyncratic productivity often, and prices respond fully
to the size of these firm-specific shocks. I show that, even if both the cost of ac-
quiring information about monetary policy and the idiosyncratic productivity and
the volatility of monetary shocks and idiosyncratic productivity are the same, firms
will optimally prioritize acquiring new information about their idiosyncratic pro-
ductivity. Thus, prices will reflect new information about idiosyncratic shocks more
frequently. Consequently, prices change often and by large amounts in response to
idiosyncratic shocks, while responding sluggishly to monetary policy shocks.
The sticky information literature, by assuming an exogenous arrival rate for
new information, cannot generate this planning complementarity and hence strug-
gles to explain this differential rate of adjustment to idiosyncratic productivity and
monetary shocks. Consequently, the literature fails to offer an explanation that can
account for both micro and macro pricing facts.
The importance of information processing in firms can be seen in Radner
(1992), who points out that a large proportion of the workforce employed in Ameri-
4
can firms is employed for the purpose of information processing. There is substantial
direct and indirect evidence that prices set by firms do not reflect up to date in-
formation. Klenow and Willis (2007) find that price changes in CPI data reflect
older information, while Zbaracki et al. (2004) find that the costs of acquiring and
processing information are quantitatively about six times larger than physical costs
of changing prices. This evidence justifies the choice of focusing on the cost of
processing information rather than the cost of changing prices.
I show that pricing models with costly information perform better than the
standard time dependent or state dependent menu cost models in matching features
of micro data and at the same time account for the sluggish reaction of prices to mon-
etary shocks. Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008) conclude that existing standard pricing
models in macroeconomics cannot match both macro and micro facts convincingly.
Time-dependent models (Calvo, 1983; Yun, 1996) can explain the sluggish price level
only if firms change prices infrequently and by small amounts. These requirements
are at odds with micro data. The other popular alternative are state-dependent
menu cost models (Dotsey et al., 1999; Golosov and Lucas Jr., 2007). Golosov
and Lucas Jr. (2007) calibrate such a model to match micro pricing facts and con-
clude that menu cost models are unable to generate persistent real responses to
monetary shocks. Moreover, Midrigan (2008) points out that menu cost models
struggle in generating small price changes. This is at odds with the empirically ob-
served distribution of price changes, which has been found to have numerous small
changes. Some recent next generation state dependent models like Midrigan (2008)
and Gertler and Leahy (2008) get around this problem by assuming economies of
5
scope and Poisson shocks, respectively. The model in this paper generates a large
number of small price changes by not requiring firms to incur a physical cost of
changing prices. A calibrated model matches the micro pricing facts, it is still able
to generate a persistent response of output to monetary shocks.3
Mankiw and Reis (2010) highlight that: (1) firms change prices all the time,
(2) firms set price schedules over time rather than prices at each instant and (3)
sometimes these schedules are flat. This paper is able to capture all these aspects. I
show that the model is capable of accounting for firms setting price plans over time
as in Burstein (2006). Unlike Burstein (2006), I do not impose a physical cost of
changing price schedules.
From a methodological point of view, the paper presents a model where ag-
gregation is tractable. Modeling the information acquisition decision as choosing
the duration of inattentiveness allows one to utilize the tractability that hierarchi-
cal information structures offer in aggregating models with dispersed information
(Townsend, 1983). The resulting hierarchical information structure allows an easy
and exact solution to the problem of forecasting the forecasts of others. This problem
in general results in infinite dimensional state spaces which makes it difficult to find
exact solutions. In addition, the solution to my model can be split into two parts,
allowing the information choice to be solved as a deterministic control problem. This
is similar methodologically to recent papers like Reis (2011), who decomposes a ra-
3Hellwig and Venkateswaran (2009) also present a model with endogenous information choice.
On calibrating their model to match micro pricing moments, their model is also unable to generate
substantial persistence in the response of output to a monetary shock. However, they allow firms
to learn from past market generated information. In addition, the firms are not allowed to receive
independent signals about only one type of shock. This reduces the persistence of the effect of
monetary policy.
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tional inattention problem into a stochastic part and a fully deterministic control
problem.
In addition to the calibration exercise, I conduct an empirical study in the
spirit of Lucas Jr. (1973). Instead of looking at cross-country differences in the ef-
fectiveness of monetary policy, I examine how the effectiveness of monetary policy
has changed since 1969. The 1970’s were a period of many monetary ‘mistakes’
(Romer and Romer, 2002). Monetary policy actively tried to exploit the Phillips
curve relation and was more discretionary than in the subsequent decades. The
model predicts that the central bank has a tradeoff between the extent of discre-
tionary policy changes and effectiveness of monetary policy. If there are frequent
shocks to monetary policy which are also large in magnitude, firms would choose to
remain inattentive for shorter durations. As a result, the time before which all firms
get informed about a shock to monetary policy will be short. The aggregate price
will reflect monetary shocks as soon as all firms update their information and hence
the effect of monetary shocks on output dies out quicker. Estimating the model
consistent Phillips Curve separately over subsamples covering the 1970’s and the
subsequent decades enables estimation of the duration for which firms choose to re-
main inattentive to changes in monetary policy. By looking at the estimates of this
duration over the two subsamples, I can infer that firms updated their information
more frequently during the 1970’s than in later decades. Hence monetary policy
had a more persistent effect on output in later decades than during the 1970’s.
The paper is arranged as follows. In the next section, I present the basic
model. Section 3 contains a description of the equilibrium under costly and costless
7
information. Section 4 contains the main analytical results. Section 5 presents the
calibration strategy and discusses the quantitative performance of the calibrated
model. I present the results of the empirical study in Section 6. I conclude in
Section 7.
1.2 Model
The model combines features from Golosov and Lucas Jr. (2007), Hellwig and
Veldkamp (2009) and Reis (2007). Time is continuous.4 The economy consists of
a representative household and a unit mass of ex-ante identical monopolistically
competitive firms indexed by i ∈ [0, 1] which produce differentiated goods. Each of
the households are infinitely lived and consume goods produced by each monopolis-
tically competitive firm. I do not model entry or exit of firms, and hence the mass
of firms remains constant over time.
The economy is subject to two kinds of shocks: a monetary shock and firm-
specific idiosyncratic shocks. The monetary authority is assumed to follow a money
supply rule, which implies that the log of nominal money supply follows a Brownian
motion with drift µ variance σ2m
d lnM(t) = µdt+ σmdW (t) (1.1)
where W (t) is a standard Brownian motion. µ is the steady state rate of inflation.
4The use of continuous time is to avoid multiple equilibria in the choice of the optimal planning
horizons with strategic complementarity. See Hellwig and Veldkamp (2009) for details.
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σ2m can be thought as the degree of discretion of the monetary authority; a higher
σ2m corresponds to a higher degree of discretion as it means larger deviations from
the deterministic component of the rule.
Firm specific productivity shocks Zi(t) are assumed to be i.i.d across firms and
follow a mean reverting Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process with zero drift, rate of mean
reversion η and variance σ2z as in Golosov and Lucas Jr. (2007):
d lnZi(t) = −η lnZi(t)dt+ σzBi(t) (1.2)
where Bi(t) is a standard Brownian motion such that for j 6= j′, Bj and Bj′ are
independent. Each Bj is also independent of W . Earlier work such as Lach and
Tsiddon (1992) and Golosov and Lucas Jr. (2007) argue for the need of an idiosyn-
cratic shock, since the average size of price changes is large and thus cannot be fully
explained by average inflation, which is not large.
1.2.1 Representative Household’s Problem
The household enjoys utility from consumption of a final good, leisure and
from holding real balances.5 Disutility from labor enters utility in a linear fashion
as in Hansen (1985). The representative household’s problem can be written as
5The log utility specification for real balances allows analytical tractability. Without this func-
tional form, the analytical solution would not be possible. However, the predictions of the model


























Q(t)[P (t)c(t) +R(t)MD(t)− ω(t)n(t)− Π(t)]dt
}
(1.3)
where Q(t) is the shadow price of nominal cash flows, and Π(t) includes the nominal














which aggregates consumption of a continuum of goods indexed i ∈ [0, 1].
The first-order conditions with respect to C(t), n(t) and MD(t) can be written
10
as
e−ρtC(t)−γ = λQ(t)P (t) (1.4)





where λ is the multiplier on (1.3) and is independent of time. Utility maximization








There is a continuum of ex-ante identical monopolistically competitive firms
indexed by i ∈ [0, 1], each of whom produce a differentiated variety. Firm i’s pro-




where A > 0 is a constant and θ ∈ (0, 1]. Zi(t) is the firm-specific idiosyncratic pro-
ductivity shock and Li(t) is the amount of labor that the firm hires in an economy-
wide labor market from households at a wage rate ω(t) at date t.6 Firm i’s nominal
6I abstract from capital in the production process. Including capital accumulation decisions
complicates the analysis by potentially raising issues of Forecasting the Forecasts of Others as in
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profit, excluding the cost of information acquisition, at date t can be written as






Each firm faces a fixed labor cost Fm , if they decide to acquire information about
the monetary shock and Fz if they plan about the idiosyncratic state. The firm then
chooses its process of prices {Pi(t)}∞t=0, and a process of planning dates {Dmi (t), Dzi (t)}∞t=0













taking as given {P (t), Q(t), ω(t), C(t)}∞t=0 and its information set at date 0. dDki (t) =
1 refers to the firm’s decision to plan about state k ∈ {m, z} at date t, and dDki (t) =
0 otherwise.
1.3 Equilibrium
Money Market Equilibrium. Money market equilibrium requires that MD(t) =
M(t). The interest rate ensures that the demand for money equals the supply.
Appendix A.1.1 shows that the nominal interest rate is constant in equilibrium.





Townsend (1983). Despite not modelling capital explicitly, I can evaluate the effect of fixed factors
by varying the returns to scale to labor. θ < 1 or decreasing returns can be interpreted as the
presence of a fixed factor.
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Labor Market Equilibrium. Equations (1.5) and (1.6) imply the following re-
lationship between equilibrium the wage rate ω(t) and money supply M(t):
ω(t) = αR(t)M(t) (1.11)
Thus, lnω(t) is also a Brownian motion with variance σ2m:
d lnω(t) = d lnM(t) = µdt+ σmdW (t) (1.12)
Goods Market Equilibrium. Equations (1.4) and (1.6), along with equation








Since there is no capital in the economy, the entire output is allocated either to con-
sumption or to the resource cost of updating information. The resource constraint
can be written as









represents the resource cost associated with the cost incurred by firms in updating
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their information. dΓmt (t) and dΓ
z
t (t) represent the mass of firms updating their in-
formation about the aggregate and idiosyncratic states respectively and are formally
defined in Section 1.3.2.
1.3.1 Costless Information
This is the case when Fm = Fz = 0 and will be referred to as the Costless
Information case. Since information is free, firms update their information set at
each instant and hence know the realizations of all shocks through the present.
Lemma 1. In the Full Information case, firm i sets the optimal profit maximizing
price given by
lnP fi (t) = ζ lnZi(t) + r lnP
f (t) + (1− r) lnM(t) (1.15)
where ζ = −1




In equation (1.15), r measures the strength of the strategic complementarity
in pricing. Note that ∂ lnPi
∂ lnP
= r > 0. If r = 0, then lnPi(t) = ζ lnZi(t)+lnM(t), i.e.
there is no strategic complementarity. Strategic complementarity in pricing implies
that a firm wants to set its price close to the average price.
Steady State: A steady state in this economy is defined by the case where
there are no monetary or idiosyncratic productivity shocks, i.e., lnZi(t) = 0,∀i ∈
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[0, 1] and d lnM(t) = µdt. All real variables are constant in the steady state and
nominal variables grow at a constant rate. In the steady state, all firms would want
to set the same price at each instant such that
d lnP ssi (t) = d lnP
ss(t) = µdt
i.e. all prices increase at the rate of growth of money supply.
Proposition 1. Classical Dichotomy: In the Full Information case, prices track
nominal money balances. Monetary policy is neutral.
Proof. Appendix A.1.3 shows that the aggregate price level tracks money supply
perfectly. Equations (1.13) and (1.14) then demonstrate that real output is unaf-
fected by a change in money supply.
Each firm sets its price to exactly match the target price defined in equation
(1.15). Prices reflect up-to-date information about the aggregate and idiosyncratic
state at all points in time. Hence, prices adjust proportionally to changes in money
supply such that nominal shocks have no effect on real output even in the short run;
both the long and short run Phillips curves are vertical. Strategic complementarity
in pricing has no impact in this costless information setting.
1.3.2 Costly Information
When information is costly to acquire, a firm’s problem can be thought of
as one in which it is trying to track a target price. In general, each firm knows
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the stochastic process of its target price, which is a function of the exogenously
specified processes for the monetary and idiosyncratic productivity shocks. Since
the firm observes all realizations of the exogenous shocks in the costless information
case, it always knows its target price exactly. However, this is not the case when
Fm and Fz are positive, i.e. when firms need to expend resources to collect and
process new information. In such a setting, it is natural to think of a firm’s decision
as one in which it chooses to update its information intermittently. In the costly
information case, the firm only observes a particular history of shocks when it incurs
the associated cost, and hence can only observe its stochastically evolving target
price when it updates its information. The expected lifetime loss to the firm from



















Maximizing the objective in equation (1.9) is equivalent to minimizing the expression
in equation (1.16). A second order Taylor expansion of the loss function in (1.16)




e−ρt[lnPi(t)− lnP fi (t)]2dt+
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt[CmdDmi (t) + CzdDzi (t)]dt
}
(1.17)










. Ck, k = m, z can be
interpreted as the cost in terms of labor of acquiring and processing information
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about the state k.
The first term in equation (1.17) can be labeled as the loss from mis-pricing
and can be interpreted as the loss from setting prices in an uninformed state. The
second and third terms represent the resource costs that a firm must bear when it
plans/collects and processes new information about the aggregate and idiosyncratic
state respectively. Incurring the costs to update information reduces the loss from
mis-pricing.
For ease of exposition in solving the model, define the following
Define: pi(t) = lnPi(t), p(t) = lnP (t),m(t) = lnM(t), zi(t) = lnZi(t) and p
∗(t) =
rp(t) + (1− r)m(t).
From the first order condition of the minimization problem specified in equation
(1.17), firm i that last planned at (τ̂m, τ̂z) will set price:
pi(t) = E{p(t) | Iτ̂m , I iτ̂z} = E{p
∗(t) | Iτ̂m}+ ζE{zi(t) | I iτ̂z} (1.18)
where Iτ̂m = {m(s)}s≤τ̂m and I iτ̂z = {zi(s)}s≤τ̂z and pi(t) ≡ p
∗(t) + ζzi(t) is the
target (log) price that firm i wants to set to maximize profit. Since the aggregate
price is determined endogenously and depends on the decisions of all other firms,
the target price is also endogenously determined. This distinguishes the current
model from other research such as Bonomo et al. (2010) where this target price is
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exogenously specified. As mentioned earlier, the firm observes the true target price
only when it simultaneously acquires information about both the monetary and
idiosyncratic state. Acquiring information about the monetary state only allows the
firm to calculate the first component of the target price, while acquiring information
about its idiosyncratic productivity reveals the second component. On dates when
the firm does not update either type of information, the firm sets a price equal to
the expected target price given its most recent information.
As information acquisition is costly, firms choose not to update their infor-
mation at each date. At date t, the economy is characterized by a cross sectional
distribution of firms, Γt(τm, τz), with different vintages of information. Γt(τm, τz)
denotes the fraction of firms that updated their information about monetary shocks
prior to date τm and about their own idiosyncratic productivity prior to date τz.
Accordingly, the marginal distribution, Γmt (τm) ∈ [0, 1], refers to the mass of firms
at time t that acquired information about monetary policy prior to date τm while
Γzt (τz) represents the mass of firms that last acquired information about their id-
iosyncratic productivity prior to date τz. dΓ
m
t (τ) and dΓ
z
t (τ) denote the marginal
densities, i.e. the mass of firms that acquire information exactly at date τ about
monetary policy and their idiosyncratic productivity respectively.7 The evolution of






Dkt (s)dΓkt (s) ,∀t ≤ τ and k = m, z (1.19)
7In other words, the fraction 1− Γmt (τm) is the fraction of firms that know all the realizations
of the aggregate state up to date τm : {ms}s≤τm and 1− Γzt (τz) has the analogous interpretation
for the idiosyncratic state.
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where Dkt (s) is the probability that a firm that most recently acquired information
about the aggregate (idiosyncratic)state at date s will acquire information about
the aggregate (idiosyncratic) state again at date t.
Because of the dispersed information about the state of monetary policy, a
firm’s decision depends on all the past realizations of the aggregate and idiosyncratic
state, making the dimensionality of the firm’s problem infinite.8 I use the method
of undetermined coefficients to find an analytical solution to the firm’s problem in
(A.1.4).9 I set µ = 0 in the subsequent analysis for ease of exposition.10
Lemma 2. In equilibrium, the following are true:




[1− Γmt (τ)](1− r)
1− r + rΓmt (τ)
dW (τ) (1.20)





1− r + rΓmt (τ)
dW (τ) (1.21)
3. The firm’s expectation of p∗(t) follows:




1− r + rΓmt (τ)
dW (τ) (1.22)
8See Townsend (1983), Nimark (2010) for more details.
9The basic approach to finding the solution is a two step procedure. First, I solve for the
optimal price a firm sets conditional on any information set as shown in equation (1.18). I then
solve for the firm’s optimal choice of when to update information to minimize its loss from being
uninformed. The solution to this step takes the form of a deterministic control problem.
10All proofs in the appendix do not set µ = 0. I revert to µ > 0 in Section 1.4.2.
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Proof. See A.1.4





1− r + rΓmt (τ)




Thus, firm i that last updated its information about monetary shocks at τ̂m and
about its idiosyncratic productivity at τ̂z, will set a price




1− r + rΓmt (τ)
dW (τ) + ζzi(τ̂z)e
−η(t−τ̂z)(1.24)
Next, we need to solve for the optimal planning horizon for each firm. In the present
setup, firms choose when to update their information, so they optimally decide their
information set at each instant. The difference between the forecasted and actual
target price of the firm is:




1− r + rΓmt (τ)






The first term is the forecast error in the aggregate component of the target price
given that forecasts are formed with respect to the information set Iτ̂m . The second
term is the forecast error in the idiosyncratic component of the target price where
the forecasts are made with respect to I iτ̂z .
Since W (t) and Bi(t) are standard Brownian motions with unit variance, equa-
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tions (1.25) and (1.17) imply that the loss from mis-pricing can be expressed as















≡ L1(t, τ̂m)+L2(t, τ̂z)
Since the loss function can be separated into a purely aggregate part and a purely
idiosyncratic part, the problem of when to update information about each state can
be solved as two separate problems. The first and second terms are the variances
of the forecast errors associated with forecasting the aggregate component and the
idiosyncratic component of the target price respectively.
The equilibrium in this incomplete information economy is a stationary Bayesian-
Nash Equilibrium. Two structures of equilibria arise naturally: synchronized and
staggered. In the synchronized equilibrium, all firms choose to update their in-
formation about state k, k = m, z at the same date. In the staggered stationary
equilibrium, only a fixed fraction of firms plans about the aggregate and idiosyn-
cratic state at each date. Existing research suggests that price changes are not
synchronized. For example, Lach and Tsiddon (1992) find a lack of synchronization
of price changes in Israel. Thus, I focus on the stationary staggered equilib-
rium, which is empirically more relevant. Some implications of the synchronized
equilibrium are discussed in footnote 12.
I concentrate on the pricing problem of firm i. Assume that all other firms
acquire information about the aggregate state every Tm periods and about their
idiosyncratic state every Tz periods. Thus, the proportion of firms acquiring in-
formation about the aggregate state over any interval is given 1
Tm
dt and about the
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idiosyncratic state is 1
Tz
dt. As a result, in the staggered equilibrium
Γkt (τ) =

20 if τ < t− Tk
1− t−τ
Tk
if t− Tk ≤ τ < t
for k = m, z.
To select the optimal timing of future updates to its information about the
monetary state, a firm that acquires information about monetary policy today min-

























ds+ σ2m(t− Tm − τ̂) if τ̂ < t− Tm
Similarly the problem on when to next acquire information on the idiosyncratic state















The solution to the firm’s problem can be seen as a threshold for these error
variances. The loss from being inattentive depends on the variance of the forecast
error. This variance is increasing in the duration since the firm last updated. Once
the threshold error variance for a state is reached, the firm chooses to incur the fixed
cost of acquiring information about that state and resets the forecast error variance
associated with that component of the target price to zero. It then conditions its
forecasts of the target price on this newly expanded information set. The threshold
is chosen such that if the firm did not incur the fixed cost to update its information
set, the loss from mis-pricing would result in larger overall losses than the cost of
obtaining information and reducing the forecast error.
Proposition 2. Optimal Planning Horizon: Each firm chooses to update its
information set about monetary policy shocks every T ∗m periods and about its idiosyn-
cratic productivity every T ∗z periods.
1. The unique optimal horizon for planning about the monetary shock T ∗m is im-
plicitly defined by






T ∗m − rs
ds (1.28)
2. The unique optimal horizon for planning about the idiosyncratic productivity






e−ρδ(e−2ηδ − e−2ηT ∗z )dδ (1.29)
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Proof. A.1.5 derives the expression for the T ∗m. The expression for T
∗
z can be derived
using the same procedure.
Proposition 3. If Ck > 0, then T ∗k > 0 for k = m, z.
Proof. Plugging T ∗k = 0 into the RHS of equation (1.28) or equation (1.29) yields
zero on the RHS, which is a contradiction; i.e. it is never optimal for a firm to
update its information about the aggregate state or the idiosyncratic state at each
instant unless doing so is costless.
1.4 Analytical Results
1.4.1 Differential adjustment to nominal and idiosyncratic produc-
tivity shocks
For this section, I set η = 0. As a result both, the money supply and the
idiosyncratic shock processes follow a drift-less Brownian motion
lnM(t) = σmdW (t)
lnZi(t) = σzdBi(t)




e−ρδ(T ∗z − δ)dδ (1.30)
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Lemma 3. T ∗m is increasing in the strength of the strategic complementarity, i.e.
∂T ∗m
∂r
> 0, ∀r ∈ [0, 1]
Proof. Lemma 3 can be verified by applying the Implicit Function Theorem on
equation (1.28).
Proposition 4. For r ∈ (0, 1) and normalizing ζ = 1, if σm = σz = σ and Cm =
Cz = C, then T ∗m > T ∗z
Note that equation (1.29) is of the same form as equation (1.30) with r set to
0 (with |ζ| normalized to 1). Lemma 3 then implies that T ∗z < T ∗m. Proposition 4
implies that firms choose to incorporate new information about idiosyncratic shocks
into prices more often than information about aggregate shocks, even when both
shocks are equally volatile and when the costs associated with updating information
about each shock are equivalent. Empirical evidence suggests that idiosyncratic
productivity is highly volatile relative to aggregate shocks. Thus, in the calibrated
model firms update their information about idiosyncratic productivity at a substan-
tially higher frequency. Hence, the model is able to explain differential adjustment
of prices to idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks.
Strategic complementarity in pricing spills over into information acquisition
decisions about monetary policy and causes a delay in information acquisition about
monetary shocks. This can be seen as a combination of two forces.
When a firm gets new information about monetary policy, it realizes that a
large fraction of firms remain uninformed and price according to their old informa-
tion. In the Full Information Case, the arrival of new information about a monetary
25
shock warrants a full price change. However, with costly information, a firm takes
into account the behavior of the mass of uninformed firms and tempers its pricing
response.11This diminishes the value of obtaining information about the shock to-
day, as an informed firm’s pricing behavior is constrained in the present by the mass
of uninformed firms. The firm faces an upfront cost of acquiring information today
while the benefit is accrued only in the future. This incentivizes the firm to delay
its acquisition of information about monetary shocks.




> 0 ,∀τ ∈ (τ̂ , t] iff r > 0
From the point of view of firm i, the staggered nature of information acquisition12
implies that a large fraction of firms is less informed than itself. As long as all other
firms remain uninformed about monetary policy, then no firm has an incentive
to update its information. The large mass of uninformed firms implies that the
aggregate price level moves sluggishly and does not track the money supply well.
11This is similar to the older literature on strategic complementarity such as Haltiwanger and
Waldman (1985)
12The synchronized equilibrium also has similar properties. However, instead of a unique optimal
planning horizon for the monetary state, there exists a closed interval on the real line of optimal
planning horizons, out of which any planning horizon can be the equilibrium. This multiplicity
of equilibria is due to the complementarity r ∈ (0, 1]. The optimal planning horizon for the
idiosyncratic state remains unique as there is no complementarity associated with that aspect
of pricing. For more details on the multiplicity of equilibria, see Hellwig and Veldkamp (2009).
Even so, it can be shown that the optimal planning horizon about idiosyncratic state is still
shorter than that for the aggregate monetary state. In a synchronized equilibrium, all firms adjust
prices simultaneously and hence when firms choose to update their information, prices reflect this
information fully. This is in contrast to the staggered equilibrium where prices only gradually
adjust because firms who observe the new information have to temper their response to it to
account for those who have not acquired it yet. Thus, if there is a monetary policy shock at a
time between two planning dates, the output stays at the high level and does not decline till the
next planning date at which point, it then falls to the natural level as the aggregate price adjusts
proportionally to the change in the monetary policy.
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Given the importance of relative prices to firms’ profits, a firm wants to price close
to the average. Since the aggregate price moves sluggishly, the gap between a firm’s
current price and its target price is small in terms of the loss from being uninformed.
Small losses from mis-pricing and delayed benefits from acquiring information
give rise to planning complementarities which delay information acquisition about
monetary shocks. The aggregate price does not respond on impact to a monetary
shock but catches up eventually when all firms update and incorporate the informa-
tion about the monetary shock into their prices.
Prices will reflect new information about idiosyncratic productivity more quickly
than information about monetary shocks because of the beauty contest nature of the
price setting problem. A firm seeks to limit the gap between their price and the
average price as profits depend on relative prices. At the same time, the firm also
wants to set its price to reflect the true state of monetary policy. Thus, the firm’s
pricing response to a monetary shock is contingent not just on the monetary policy
but also on how other firms respond to the nominal shock. Strategic complementar-
ity in price setting feeds into strategic complementarity in information acquisition.
As aforementioned, a firm wants to update its information about the monetary state
often if other firms do so too, and vice versa. However, a firm’s price response to
its own idiosyncratic productivity shock is not contingent on the actions of others,
as each firm is too small and cannot affect the average price. The absence of strate-
gic complementarities in pricing with respect to idiosyncratic productivity implies
that prices respond fully to idiosyncratic shocks. Moreover, this absence of strategic
complementarity in pricing extends to a lack of complementarities associated with
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planning over the idiosyncratic state. Hence, there is no delay in information ac-
quisition about idiosyncratic productivity unlike the case of information acquisition
regarding monetary policy.
1.4.2 Non Zero Long Run Inflation and Static Indexation
For this section, I relax the assumption that µ = 0. Instead, I set µ > 0 which
implies a positive constant rate of long run wage inflation. Since this section deals
with indexation of prices to long run inflation, I abstract away from idiosyncratic
productivity shocks and set zi(t) = 0 for all t. With µ > 0, the price that firm i sets
at time t when it last updated its information at date τ̂m can be seen as a modified
version of equation (1.24):13




1− r + rΓmt (τ)
dW (τ) + µt
In such a setting, prices change all the time but only reflect new information
at discrete intervals. Thus, rather than setting prices, firms set price plans which
they reset every time they update information. Since long run inflation is positive,
firms set a price schedule by which they index their prices to long run inflation in
between dates of information acquisition.
A large portion of the literature on the New Keynesian Phillips curve, which
make use of the Calvo-Yun type sticky price setup, assumes that the non-adjusting
firms index their prices to past lags of inflation or average inflation [Erceg et al.
13This expression is derived in A.1.4.
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(2000) etc.]. Indexation is often motivated as rule-of-thumb behavior followed by
the non-adjusting firms. This model gives micro foundations to such an assumption.
The inflation indexation is an attempt by a firm to minimize its forecast error.
During periods when a firm chooses not to update its information, the firm sets
price plans which require it to raise their prices at a rate commensurate with long
run inflation. Each firm’s price is indexed to long run inflation and hence changes
all the time. However, monetary policy is still effective in the short run because new
information is only incorporated into prices gradually, implying that the aggregate
price still moves sluggishly in response to a monetary shock.
1.4.3 Mean Reverting Idiosyncratic Productivity Shocks
Mankiw and Reis (2010) point out three features which are prominent in an-
alyzing price paths observed in the data:
1. Prices change all the time, on average every three to four months.
2. Many price changes follow what seem like predetermined patterns that follow
simple algorithms, and actual resetting of price plans based on new information
seems less frequent.
3. There are many horizontal segments, reflecting short-lived intervals when nom-
inal prices are unchanged.
In addition to the three facts, empirical studies have found that relative price
changes are transitory. The basic model specified in Section 2 is capable of gener-
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ating pricing behavior which is consistent with all the above features.14 Empirical
evidence suggests that idiosyncratic shocks are very volatile and hence firms would
tend to update their information about idiosyncratic shocks frequently. Prices in-
corporate new information more often, which results in large jumps in prices from
firms resetting their price plans (See Figure 1.1).
In the present setup, firms update their information about idiosyncratic pro-
ductivity every T ∗z [defined in equation (1.29)] periods and reset price plans every
time they do so. They set prices according to this new plan at every subsequent
date until they update their information again. Prices change at each date but only
incorporate new information at discrete intervals which correspond to resetting of
price plans at the arrival of new information. This is consistent with Blinder et al.
(1998), who find evidence of managers’ adjusting their price plans.
Suppose firm i updates its information about idiosyncratic productivity today
at t = t0 and observes that z(t0) = z0 is above the mean. Since the marginal
cost schedule is lower this period, the firm can afford to set a lower relative price
and attract more demand. However, since productivity is mean reverting, the firm
expects productivity to fall back to the average at a rate η. The firm chooses not
to update its information between t0 and t0 + T
∗
z . During this period, it sets
prices according to a simple pricing plan that it determined at t0. The price plan
stipulates that prices be raised over time towards the average price to compensate
for the increasing marginal costs, and is set to track the target price as closely as
14For ease of exposition, I again set µ = 0 since µ does not affect relative prices. I also set the
variance of nominal shocks to zero.
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possible. The price plan can be written as
pi(t) = ζz0e
−η(t−t0)for t0 ≤ t ≤ T ∗z (1.31)
At t0 + T
∗
z , the firm updates information about its idiosyncratic productivity and
resets the price plan. Suppose it observes that z(t0 + T
∗




z + dt) = ζz1e
−ηdt for 0 ≤ dt < T ∗z
As can be seen from the price plan in equation (1.31), the model predicts that
relative price changes are transitory which is consistent with empirical findings.
The model struggles at generating flat price paths. In terms of the model, flat
price paths wouldoccur when at the planning date t0, the firm observes z(t0) = 0
at the planning date. Under a diffusion process, the probability of drawing z = 0
is a zero measure event. Thus, without introducing any other friction, observing a
flat price path is a zero measure event. A possible solution to this problem might
be found in a rational inattention setup as in Woodford (2008). In such a setting,
rationally inattentive firms might choose to set prices out of a discrete set even if
the shock process is continuous. This would complicate the aggregation problem
and is left for future research.
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1.4.4 Volatility of Monetary Policy Shocks and Effectiveness of Mon-
etary Policy
Proposition 5. For r ∈ (0, 1), duration for which firms remain inattentive about




< 0 , ∀k ∈ {m, z}
Proof. The proof is provided for the relation between T ∗m and σ
2












(1− r)e−ρs Tm − s
Tm − rs
ds− Cm



























= − , since 0 < r < 1
Proposition 5 has direct implications for the effectiveness of monetary policy.
The longer firms choose to stay inattentive about changes to monetary policy, the
more persistent is the effect of monetary policy on output. This is because the effect
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of monetary policy on output dies out as soon as all firms learn about the monetary
policy change. If each firm updates its information frequently then all firms will
become informed about a change in policy more quickly, which then reduces the
effect of that change in monetary policy.
Thus, the model predicts that a monetary authority has a tradeoff between
effectiveness of monetary policy and the level of discretion it can use in the conduct
of monetary policy. A more discretionary monetary policy, in terms of the model,
corresponds to a higher variance of monetary policy σ2m. The model predicts that
monetary policy will have more persistent effects on output in regimes with lower
σ2m. Another way to look at this prediction is that periods with high inflation
volatility (high σ2m) correspond to periods where the persistence of the effect of
monetary policy on output is lower. I use this prediction of the model to analyze
the effectiveness of monetary policy in the US since the 1970’s in Section 6.
1.5 Calibration and Numerical Results
As is standard in the New Keynesian literature (e.g. Gertler and Leahy
(2008)), I simulate the model around a zero long run inflation steady state, i.e.
I set µ to 0. I draw on existing literature for the values of the preference parameters
ρ, γ, α, and ε. The discount rate ρ is set to 0.04, following an annual calibration.
The risk aversion parameter γ is set to to 2. The elasticity of substitution param-
eter ε is set to 10. The disutility of labor α is set to 9, which implies that roughly
33 percent of the unit time endowment is allocated to labor in steady state. The
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exponent on labor in the production function is calibrated to the standard value
of θ = 2/3. This calibration yields r = 0.7917 which measures the strength of the
strategic complementarity in price setting. Woodford (2003) suggests values of r
between 0.75 and 0.9. I set σm = 0.0248, which corresponds to the standard devi-
ation of annual inflation in the Klenow-Kryvtsov data set. To calibrate the cost of
acquiring and processing information, I draw on existing literature. Studies such as
Chevalier et al. (2003) estimate menu costs to be of the order of about 0.75 per cent
of a firm’s revenue. Zbaracki et al. (2004) report that information processing costs
are 6 times as large as menu costs. Thus, I set the cost of acquiring information
as 0.75 × 6 = 4.5 percent of steady state revenue. Without any strong reason to
set the cost of acquiring information about monetary shocks differently from that
about the idiosyncratic state, I set Cm = Cz.
This leaves two parameters to be calibrated: the variance σ2z and the rate of
mean reversion η of idiosyncratic productivity shocks. I follow a calibration strategy
similar to Golosov and Lucas Jr. (2007). First, I shut down the monetary policy
shock. Thus, all price changes are in response to idiosyncratic shocks. I calibrate
σ̂2z ≡ ζ2σ2z and η by targeting the average number of price reviews per year and
the average size of a price change conditional on a price increase.15 I choose the
parameters to minimize the sum of the squared differences between the values of
the two targets in the data and the model generated counterparts.
Alvarez et al. (2010) report that the median number of price reviews per year in
15Equations (1.15) and (1.18) show that ζ determines the sensitivity of the profit-maximizing
price to the idiosyncratic state variable and has the same effect as the variance of the idiosyncratic
state variable. Therefore, I normalize |ζ| to one and only choose the variance of the idiosyncratic
state variable. Thus, I calibrate σ̂2z ≡ ζ2σ2z instead of just σ2z .
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the US is between 2 and 3. I target the median number of price reviews a year to be
3. Golosov and Lucas Jr. (2007) find that the average price change conditional on a
price increase is 0.095 for regular price changes in the Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008)
dataset. Minimizing the squared difference yields σ̂z = 0.58, which corresponds
to a quarterly standard deviation of 0.14, and η = 0.6652, which corresponds to a
persistence of 0.85 in a quarterly AR(1). I simulate the model with the shortest time
period being a month to calculate the average size of price changes. The calibration
exercise yields 0.086 as the average price change conditional on an increase and 3.9
price reviews a year. Details of the calibration are summarized in Table 1.
I calculate the optimal planning horizon about the monetary state from equa-
tion (1.28). The half-life of the response of output is approximately 5.2 years.16
Thus, unlike Golosov and Lucas Jr. (2007), this model is able to generate substan-
tial non-neutralities and a strongly persistent effect of a shock to monetary policy
on output.
Golosov and Lucas Jr. (2007) note that the strength of the non-neutrality is
increasing in the share of the fixed factor which can be measured as 1 − θ. This is
because the degree of strategic complementarity (r) in price setting is decreasing in
16If I let Cm 6= Cz, then the model is able to match any characteristics of both the micro level data
and sluggish responses of prices. On setting Cm to be 0.1 percent of steady state revenue, a positive
shock to monetary policy results in a positive effect on output for approximately 6 quarters which
is the length of the non-neutrality estimated in Christiano et al. (1999). It is not unreasonable
to believe that the cost of acquiring information about monetary policy might be substantially
smaller than the cost associated with the idiosyncratic state. Information has characteristics of a
public good and becomes cheaper as more people choose to acquire it. All firms are looking for
the same information about monetary policy while they only want information about their own
idiosyncratic state. Thus, the higher demand for information about monetary policy makes the
cost of acquiring information about it much lower. This can be also seen from the fact that one
might learn about the state of monetary policy from reading a newspaper which is much cheaper
than a firm hiring consultants to find out about its demand and cost advantages. Veldkamp and
Wolfers (2007) formalize such an argument.
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Parameter Source/Target
Disutility of Labor α = 9 Steady state labor = 0.34
Coefficient RRA γ = 2 Std. in literature
Share of Labor in output θ = 2
3
Std. in literature
Elasticity of substituiton across
goods
ε = 10 Std. in literature
Discount Rate ρ = 0.04 Std. Annual Calibration
S.D. of monetary shock σm = 0.0248 Annual standard deviation
of inflation from Klenow
and Kryvtsov (2008)
Cost of updating information C = 0.0088 Chevalier et al. (2003),
Zbaracki et al. 2004
S.D. of idiosyncratic shock σ̂z = 0.58 S.D. of price changes con-
ditional on increase = 0.91,
Golosov and Lucas(2007)
Persistence of idiosyncratic shock η = 0.6652 # Price Reviews/year= 3
,Alvarez et al. (2010)
Table 1.1: Baseline Parameter Values
1 − θ. Even with θ = 0.99, i.e, even if the importance of the fixed factor and the
degree of the strategic complementarity (r = 0.0872) are much lower than suggested
by Woodford (2003), the model still generates significant non-neutrality. The half-
life of the effect on output for θ = 0.99 is 2.8 years.
Figure 1.1 shows the paths of prices set by a firm under costly information
compared to under costless information in response to a sample path of idiosyncratic
shocks. Monetary Shocks are shut down in the figure, so prices are only reacting to
changes in idiosyncratic productivity. The dashed line corresponds to the path of a
firm’s price under costless information. The solid line shows the reaction of price in
an environment with costly information. The vertical lines indicate price reviews,
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i.e periods when firms update their information. The vertical dotted lines indicate
a price review. The price jumps at the arrival of new information. Prices under
costly information are certainly smoother but not very different from those under
full information. The realized loss in profit from mis-pricing is not very large, since
firms choose to update their information about idiosyncratic productivity frequently.















Sample Price Path (only idiosyncratic shocks)
 
 
Price Path (Costless Information)
Price Path (Costly Information)
Figure 1.1: Price Paths of Representative firm in response to idiosyncratic shocks
The impulse response of output and the aggregate price to a positive monetary
shock of one standard deviation magnitude can be seen seen in Figure 1.2. : The
top panel depicts the response of aggregate price and the bottom panel depicts the
deviation of output from the natural level. T ∗, in the figure, is the optimal planning
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Figure 1.2: Impulse Response to a monetary expansion
a large fraction of firms being uninformed about the current true state. This allows
for the model to generate sufficient heterogeniety in firm behavior. Midrigan (2008)
points out that heterogeneity between firms in Golosov and Lucas Jr. (2007) is very
limited and hence prices adjust very quickly to a shock in their model. Pricing and
planning complementarities result in a sluggish response of the aggregate price to a
monetary shock which results in output being different from the natural level. Once
all firms update their information sets such that each of them has incorporated the
shock to monetary policy into their prices, the aggregate price adjusts fully to the
shock and output reverts back to the natural level.
Figure 1.3 shows how the aggregate price evolves under costly information
in reaction to a sample path for monetary policy shocks as compared to the case
with costless information. The dashed line is the path of (log) money supply. The
dashed line also corresponds to the path of the aggregate (log) price in reaction to
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monetary policy shocks under costless information. The solid line corresponds to the
response of the aggregate price under the costly information case. Changes in the















(Log) Aggregate Price Level − Costless Information
(Log) Agregate Price Level − Costly Information
Figure 1.3: Sample Price Path of the aggregate price in response to a sequence of
monetary policy shocks.
aggregate price are much smaller in the case with costly information compared to
the case with costless information. Furthermore, the aggregate price responds slowly
to shocks when information is costly. From Proposition 1, in a setting with costless
information, the aggregate price tracks money supply perfectly. Thus, a fall(rise)
in the dashed line in the figure corresponds to a contractionary (expansionary)
shock to money supply. The solid line, representing the path of the aggregate price
with costly information lags behind the dashed line. With costly information, the
aggregate price starts to fall well after a contractionary shock to money supply and
displays inertia as it continues to fall even after there has been an expansionary
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shock to monetary policy.



























Distribution of price changes
Figure 1.4: Distribution of size of price changes
Figure 1.4 plots the distribution of price changes along a sample price path.
As Midrigan (2008) and Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008) point out, standard SDP
models generate what has been termed the missing middle, i.e they fail to explain
small price changes. Midrigan (2008) also points out that the distribution of price
changes exhibits excess kurtosis. The current model is capable of generating this
excess kurtosis and is able to explain a large number of both small price changes and
at the same time, also large price changes. Since there is no cost associated with
changing prices per se, the firm changes prices even when only small price changes
are warranted. This is not the case in menu cost models.
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1.6 Testing the Effectiveness of Monetary Policy
In this section, I look at changes in the effectiveness of US monetary policy
since 1969. This empirical study is in the spirit of Lucas Jr. (1973). Instead of look-
ing at cross-country differences in the effectiveness of monetary policy as in Lucas
Jr. (1973), I examine changes in the effectiveness of US monetary policy over time.
Economists generally agree that the 1970s, a period of high volatility in both output
and inflation, was also a period in which monetary policy was highly discretionary
and performed quite poorly, relative to both earlier and later periods (Romer and
Romer, 2002). In terms of the current model, the 1970’s would correspond to a
higher σ2m than in subsequent periods. Following Proposition 5, this would imply
that T1970′s > Tpost1970′s, i.e. monetary policy had less persistent effects on output
in the 1970’s than in subsequent periods.
To test the above claim, I estimate T from equation (1.32) over separate sub-
samples. I use the 1970’s as the first subsample and the subsequent years as the
second subsample. Following Bernanke and Mihov (1998), I use the following two
breakpoints for a change in policy regime between the 1970’s and the subsequent
period. The first breakpoint is 1979(Q3), which corresponds to the announcement
of chairman Volcker’s new operating regime. The second breakpoint is 1982(Q1),
which Bernanke and Mihov (1998) claim as roughly corresponding to the abandon-
ment of targeting of non-borrowed reserves in favor of interest rate control.




pt − Et−T [pt]
T





Et−1−j[πt + (1− r)∆yt] + εt(1.32)
where T ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, ...} is the number of quarters each firm chooses to wait before it
updates its information about monetary policy, pt is the log price at time t, yt is the
output gap, r ∈ R is the strength of the strategic complementarity in pricing, and
εt is a measurement error which is i.i.d across time and is appended to the SIPC for
estimation purposes. The full derivation is available in Appendix A.1.6. Compared
to the standard version of the SIPC (Mankiw and Reis, 2002), this version of the
model demonstrates an optimal relation between T and the number of lags that
need to be included to estimate the Phillips Curve relationship consistently.17
To proxy for the forecasts of firms, I use data from the Survey of Professional
Forecasters (Croushore, 1993). The survey provides individual responses of a panel
of forecasters with up to four quarter ahead forecasts for the level of the price
index and nominal GDP. Consistent forecasts of real GDP, inflation and the output
gap are based on this information.18 To calculate the values of the consolidated
forecast in every quarter period, I calculate the median and mean forecasts within
the cross-section of professional forecasters. Using the median or the mean does not
alter results qualitatively.19 The main limitation of the dataset is that forecasts are
17See A.2.1 for a detailed discussion.
18As in Coibion (2010), I assume that the forecasters know the CBO’s measure of potential
output at the time of forecasting. This enables me to calculate the forecasted output gap as the
log difference between the forecasted real GDP and the measure of potential output for a particular
quarter.
19Since the data in the period prior to the 1980’s has some missing values for forecasts 4 quarters
ahead of some of the variables of interest, I impute these values by averaging the data for the
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available only up to 4 quarters ahead which limits the parameter space for T to
{1, 2, 3, 4}.20
As a preliminary check, I estimate the parameters of equation (1.32) by the
method of Maximum Likelihood Estimation.21 Estimating the model over the whole
sample yields an estimate of T̂ = 4. This corresponds to one price review every
year,22 which is consistent with other empirical findings such as Blinder et al. (1998).
T = 4 is also consistent with the Mankiw and Reis (2002) estimate of the exogenous
arrival rate of new information (1− λ = 0.25).
Estimating the model over the sub-samples separated by the first break point
gives us the point estimates of T̂t<1979(Q3) = 3 and T̂t≥1979(Q3) = 4. Using the second
break point also yields the estimates T̂t<1982(Q1) = 3 and T̂t≥1982(Q1) = 4. Thus, firms
were updating information more frequently in the 1970’s, a period which in terms of
the model corresponds to a higher σ2m . Conversely, firms update information more
slowly in periods where monetary policy is less discretionary and σ2m is low. Finally,
I test the null hypothesis H0 : Tt<1979(Q3) ≤ Tt≥1979(Q3) against the complement, and
also test the null that H0 : Tt<1982(Q1) ≤ Tt≥1982(Q1) against its complement.
Through a likelihood ratio test,23 I am able to reject the hypothesis that
Tt<1979(Q3) ≤ Tt≥1979(Q3) in favor of the alternative Tt<1979(Q3) > Tt≥1979(Q3) at the 1%
neighboring quarters which are available. Alternatively, dropping these entries does not alter the
results qualitatively.
20T = 1 implies that each firm updates information every quarter and so there is no sticky
information. In this case the SIPC relationship breaks down and equation (1.32) is not valid.
Thus, I focus on T ∈ {2, 3, 4}
21See A.2.1 for details.
22The null hypothesis of H0 : T = 4 v/s Ha : T < 4 cannot be rejected even with 90% confidence
in a likelihood ratio test.
23see A.2.1 for details.
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level of significance, i.e. firms updated their information more frequently prior to
1979(Q3). Moreover, using the second breakpoint, I am able to reject the hypothesis
that Tt<1982(Q1) ≤ Tt≥1982(Q1) in favor of the alternative Tt<1982(Q1) > Tt≥1982(Q1) at
the 5% level of significance. These results are supportive of the model’s predictions.
Through the lens of the model, the aggregate price responded more quickly to mon-
etary policy shocks in the 1970’s than in subsequent decades, and hence monetary
policy had a relatively less persistent effect on output in the 1970’s.
1.7 Conclusion
Unlike the sticky information literature, the model presented in this paper is
capable of explaining the differential adjustment of prices in response to monetary
and idiosyncratic shocks. By relying on costly information rather than physical menu
costs, the model is also consistent with the findings of Zbaracki et al. (2004), who find
that information processing costs associated with pricing decisions are extremely
important in determining pricing behavior. The model relies on sluggishness in
prices to explain monetary non-neutrality. This sluggishness in price adjustment is
caused by the decision of all firms to delay the acquisition of new information. This
channel is shown to be particularly important by Klenow and Willis (2007) who find
that price changes in the CPI reflect older information than would be predicted by
a costless-flexible information environment.
One of the key implications of the model is that the persistence of output
in response to a monetary shock should be decreasing in the degree of monetary
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policy discretion, or alternatively the level of inflation volatility. Using data from
the 1970’s and subsequent decades to estimate the model-consistent Phillips curve,
I confirm the hypothesis that the persistence was indeed lower in the 1970’s, which
has been identified as a period where monetary policy was actively trying to exploit
the Phillips curve relation and was highly discretionary.
The model is also able to account for features seen in micro pricing data as
documented in Mankiw and Reis (2010). When calibrated to match frequently
changing prices at the micro level, the model is still able to generate substantial
non-neutralities. This is an improvement over standard menu cost models, as it
is able to explain a sluggish response of the aggregate price to monetary shocks
despite large and frequent price changes at the micro level to idiosyncratic shocks.
In addition, the model does not suffer from the problem of the ‘missing middle’
and is able to generate a highly kurtotic distribution of price changes as has been
documented by some researchers. The paper also provides micro-foundations for
static indexation of prices, which is often assumed in the New Keynesian literature.
A shortcoming of the model is that it struggles to explain the existence of
spells during which prices do not change at all. This is because price changes are
costless, and thus firms are not deterred from changing prices by small amounts.
Prices do not adjust continuously at low levels of inflation in the data. Adding menu
costs to change prices does would resolve this problem but reintroduces the dilemma
of the ‘missing middle’. A possible resolution of this discrepancy can potentially be
found in a rational inattention setup like in Woodford (2008), as mentioned earlier.
This is left for future research.
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Chapter 2: Dispersed Beliefs and Aggregate Demand Management
2.1 Introduction
There is a long tradition in economics of trying to explain business cycle fluc-
tuations as arising from changes in expectations of economic agents. These ideas
date back at least to the early twentieth century and are highlighted in the works
of Pigou (1926) and Keynes (1936) who argue that investment decisions are sub-
ject to changes in sentiment, which in turn result in fluctuations in output. Pigou
(1926) conjectured that limited information and linkages among agents in an econ-
omy heighten the incidence of correlated forecast errors across agents over time.
These correlated forecast errors could be thought of as waves of optimism and pes-
simism which drive the economy as a whole to over or under-invest, causing fluc-
tuations in output. In a similar vein, Keynes (1936) posited that institutions such
as the stock market cause average opinion in the economy to become an object of
speculation. Thus, fluctuations in average opinion, which may be unrelated to fun-
damentals of the economy, can affect investment behavior, giving rise to the notion
of business cycle fluctuations driven by animal spirits. The basic idea behind these
sentiment-driven business cycles can be summarized as follows: when consumers
and firms become optimistic (pessimistic) about economic prospects, they consume
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and invest more (less), resulting in a boom (slump). I present a real business cycle
model with fully rational agents in which pessimism and optimism in agents’ beliefs
are generated endogenously. More precisely, I introduce dispersed information in a
standard incomplete markets heterogeneous-agent DSGE model with flexible prices
and strategic complementarity in production amongst monopolistically competitive
firms. In particular, this paper emphasizes how endogenously generated correlated
forecast errors about economic fundamentals across agents interact with their invest-
ment behavior to cause volatile swings in both current and future output. Further,
I show that these fluctuations are inefficient and that fiscal policy can be used to
reduce these fluctuations and increase welfare.
In the model, agents do not directly observe the shocks hitting the economy;
the presence of private information causes agents to hold heterogeneous beliefs about
fundamentals. As a result, agents rely on both public and private information to
infer the true fundamentals of the economy. Public signals are comprised of of
market-consistent information such as wage rates and asset prices. In addition,
strategic complementarity implies that each agent, in addition to inferring the true
fundamentals, must also infer what others perceive the fundamentals to be. In
other words, each agent must forecast the private information of other agents in
order to deduce their actions. Each agent, however, internalizes that all others have
the same forecasting problem, causing an infinite regress in expectations. This is
known as the problem of “forecasting the forecasts of others” (Townsend, 1983). The
infinite regress causes endogenous public signals such as prices to be less effective in
conveying the true state of the economy, driving and perpetuating the existence of
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dispersed information.
Agents cannot infer the true fundamentals of the economy from the informa-
tion they receive and must base their decisions on their forecast of true fundamentals.
Since all agents learn from some common signals in the form of market consistent
information, their forecasts are correlated. As a consequence their forecast errors
are correlated. Since agents base their production and investment decisions on these
correlated forecasts, there is a natural feedback effect on prices. Correlated forecast
errors can be interpreted as pessimism and optimism. Importantly, the model shows
that these correlated forecast errors can have both static and dynamic effects on the
economy. The static effects arise from the firms’ contemporaneous output decisions
which are based on correlated forecasts of today’s fundamentals. In contrast, the
dynamic effects are due to households’ intertemporal investment decisions, which
interact with these correlated forecast errors to produce persistent fluctuations in
the business cycle. These mechanisms are briefly summarized below.
Dispersed information coupled with strategic complementaries in firms’ pro-
duction decisions imply that actual output is a function of true fundamentals and
average beliefs about aggregate demand. Correlated forecasts in the form of pes-
simistic beliefs about aggregate demand today lead to a decline in current output
as firms cut back on production. These pessimistic beliefs can potentially be trig-
gered by shocks completely unrelated to the true fundamentals. This phenomenon
occurs because agents are unable to separate the effects of this noise from changes in
true fundamentals. This is the static effect of dispersed information on the business
cycle. In addition, dispersed information with strategic complementarity implies
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that agents react cautiously to information that they fear isn’t shared by others.
This results in prices not reflecting information about current conditions, and hence
output to remains persistently low. Moreover, pessimistic beliefs about today’s fun-
damentals also influence household investment decisions in two ways. First, lower
aggregate economic activity directly impinges on the households’ wealth, causing
them to accumulate less capital. Second, since aggregate productivity is persistent,
expectations of low aggregate economic activity today cause households to expect
a low benefit from holding capital tomorrow. Consequently, households accumulate
less capital, giving rise to a smaller capital stock that is available for production
tomorrow. Hence, pessimism (optimism) about fundamentals today can lead to
persistent declines (increases) in output. This dynamic effect of investment deci-
sions interacting with correlated forecasts is the driving mechanism for persistent
and volatile business cycle fluctuations in this model and is absent from the other
literature on dispersed information. In summary, it is the noisy informational con-
tent of endogenous price signals and the bias embedded in them from correlated
forecast errors that generate fluctuations based on sentiments.
I show that the volatility and persistence generated by dispersed information
is inefficient. The planner can reduce this volatility and increase welfare by using
countercyclical sales subsidies for firms and countercyclical investment subsidies for
households financed by dividend taxation. This result holds even if the planner does
not possess an informational advantage over private agents. By making taxes and
subsidies contingent on the realization of aggregate output, the planner can provide
firms with insurance against low profits by reducing the dependence of their output
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decision on average beliefs. In the absence of government intervention, agents put
too much emphasis on prices as a source of information and too little weight on
their private information at the time of making their decisions. This results in an
information externality, and there is an inefficiently low amount of information pro-
duced. Prices do not reflect information about current conditions, as they aggregate
decisions which do not respond strongly to new information. The inefficiently low
informational content of prices reinforces the dispersed information by slows down
agents’ learning about fundamentals. Furthermore, pessimism and optimism caused
by dispersed information have systematic effects on prices and cause over-investment
in booms and under-investment in recessions. The planner can reduce this by insti-
tuting a countercyclical sales subsidy, which acts as a Pigouvian tax on the use of
public information and incentivizes information production. The sales subsidy, by
providing insurance, reduces the effective degree of strategic complementarity in the
firms’ output decisions, making it less sensitive to average perceptions. Addition-
ally, it also reduces the reliance of agents on prices as sources of information. As a
result, agents respond more to idiosyncratic exogenous information which provides
a more accurate picture of true fundamentals than the asset prices which contain
slow moving information. Since firms’ decisions now respond to new information
more quickly, prices, which aggregate these decisions, are less informationally inef-
ficient. These findings confirm the Pigouvian conjecture that fluctuations arising
from dispersed information are inefficient and may benefit from corrective action.
The importance of exploring belief-driven business cycles is highlighted by the
common criticism of the lack of an internal propagation mechanism in standard
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business cycle models. These models cannot quantitatively account for post-war
recessions without relying on a large technological regress as the driving force (Cog-
ley and Nason, 1995). This criticism is particularly relevant since there is general
consensus that the Great Recession was a result of the bursting of the housing bub-
ble and was not driven by a severe decline in technology. Since bubbles represent
non-fundamental movements, the Great Recession highlights the importance of ex-
ploring the plausibility of these sentiment driven business cycles as an alternative
to the technology-based models.
However, it has been surprisingly hard to incorporate expectation-driven cy-
cles into a a standard business cycle model with rational agents. Models with dis-
persed information in which agents face dynamic signal extraction problems as in the
current setup have been proven difficult to work with. The infinite regress in expec-
tations generates an infinite dimensional state space (Townsend, 1978). Townsend
(1983) showed, in very stylized partial equilibrium examples, that economies with
dispersed information where agents have to “forecast the forecasts of others” can ex-
hibit “rapid oscillations in forecasts and decision variables in response to economic
shocks”(Townsend, 1983, pg. 548). Recently, models with dispersed information
as the cause of fluctuations have regained popularity with the influential work by
Woodford (2002), Lorenzoni (2009) and Angeletos and La’O (2008, 2010). Angeletos
and La’O (2008) explore a canonical business cycle model with firms making out-
put decisions in an environment with dispersed information; they show that noise
can be amplified and drive fluctuations independent of fundamentals of the econ-
omy. However, they simplify the problem by assuming that agents do not learn from
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endogenous signals such as prices.1 In addition, they abstract from intertemporal de-
cisions under dispersed information such as capital accumulation, and instead focus
on the static effects of dispersed information. This paper complements the literature
by adding learning from prices and an intertemporal investment decision. Loren-
zoni (2009) shows that dispersed information in the presence of nominal rigidities
can lead to noise driven fluctuations. The current paper highlights that perceptions
about aggregate demand can cause fluctuations in current and future output in an
environment with flexible prices. This opens the door for aggregate demand man-
agement policies even in the absence of nominal rigidities in a neoclassical model.
This is an important result, as most aggregate demand management policies are
seen as a response to some nominal rigidity in an economy. This result stands in
contrast to Angeletos and La’O (2010) who find that fluctuations caused by noise
under dispersed information are constrained efficient. The main reason why these
fluctuations are not constrained efficient in this model is that agents are allowed to
learn from prices. As a result, the planner can use subsidies to indirectly manipu-
late the informational content of prices as discussed earlier. Thus, the planner can
influence the decisions of forward looking agents by affecting the information that
they receive through prices. This result is reminiscent of Weiss (1980) and King
(1982), who showed that when agents learn from prices, policy, in addition to affect-
1Recently many papers have introduced dispersed information as a friction in models. Amador
and Weill (2010), Hellwig and Venkateswaran (2009), Hellwig and Venkateswaran (2012) and
Graham and Wright (2010) are just some of the papers which have introduced learning from
market information. However, most of these papers study the propagation of monetary policy
shocks in these environments. Graham and Wright (2010) is the exception in this list as it shows
that market-consistent information in a heterogeneous agent model with dispersed information
does not reveal the true fundamentals to agents.
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ing agents’ economic decisions directly, can also affect the information content of
prices by affecting the weights agents put on the endogenous and exogenous signals.
This paper is also related to the literature on information-based business cycle
models. Early attempts by Phelps (1970) and Lucas Jr. (1972) showed that imper-
fect information about monetary shocks could result in fluctuations in output arising
from monetary policy. However, the empirical relevance of this channel has been
hotly debated, since these models require either a significant lack of information or
a significant delay in access to information. Recently there has been a resurgence in
the popularity of models that attempt to provide micro-foundations for why agents
might make decisions under incomplete information. For example, the rational inat-
tention literature (Sims, 2003; Mackowiak and Wiederholt, 2009) argues that limited
ability to process information effectively implies that agents make decisions under
noisy information even if all information is available freely. Alternatively, the sticky
information literature (Mankiw and Reis, 2002; Reis, 2007) assumes that different
agents in an economy get access to new information at different times. Acharya
(2012) shows that planning complementarites may cause agents to optimally de-
lay their acquisition of information that is publicly available. This paper provides
another justification for the reduced form assumption of imperfect information by
showing that with dispersed information, prices may fail to reveal all information
about the true fundamentals of the economy, and hence agents make decisions under
incomplete information.
Another related strand of literature has focused on full information models
with news shocks to generate business cycle fluctuations. This literature studies
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the response of an economy to news about future economic fundamentals. This
literature has faced difficulties, as Barro and King (1984), Cochrane (1994) and
others have shown that the standard business cycle model generates a recession
today in response to good news about future productivity. Optimism about the
future leads to a contraction in output. These models have had limited success in
generating the empirically observed co-movement in consumption, investment and
employment. Recently, Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009) have shown how particular
preference structures combined with variable capital utilization can yield positive
co-movement in response to good news about tomorrow. This literature labels
exogenous good (bad) news about the future as optimism (pessimism), while the
current paper defines optimism (pessimism) as an endogenously generated belief
which results in agents over-estimating (under-estimating) future productivity.2
This paper also addresses Hayek’s (1945)3 claim that markets are particularly
effective at dealing with the limits to information and perception that are inherent
in a market environment with a large number of participants. He argued that
prices aggregate information efficiently and made dispersed information irrelevant.
This paper shows that this is not always the case and highlights that prices in fact
may exacerbate the problem by reinforcing dispersed information. Becasue prices
do not aggregate information efficiently, the market needs to be supplemented by
2There is a separate literature that uses the idea of indeterminacy of equilibrium and sunspots
in explaining business cycles fluctuations arising from “animal spirits”. This literature provides an
attractive way to explain expectation-driven business cycle fluctuation. However, in this paper, I
impose restrictions which rule out the existence of sunspots and multiple equilibrium. Thus, my
model provides a channel for belief-driven business cycles which is separate from the mechanisms




government intervention to restore efficiency.
As discussed above, models with dispersed information featuring a dynamic
signal extraction problem have been regarded as intractable, as they lead to infinite
dimensional state spaces. This complexity has resulted in very few papers exploring
the implications of dispersed information in a fully specified business cycle model.
This paper draws on methods suggested by Whiteman (1983) and Kasa (2000),
which transform the problem into the frequency domain to make the problem more
tractable and helps in computing exact solutions. This can be seen as a method-
ological contribution of the current paper, which complements alternate approaches
used to solve the infinite regress problem, such as Nimark (2010), Lorenzoni (2009)
and others who attempt to find approximate solutions in the time domain.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the model economy.
Section 2.3 sets up the log-linearized model and solves for the equilibrium under the
full information case and under a case with dispersed information. I then highlight
how dispersed information changes the predictions of the standard model by pre-
senting results from a calibration exercise. In Section 2.5, I explore the normative
implications of dispersed information and present the solution to the problem of a
constrained social planner. Next, I show how the constrained efficient allocations
can be implemented by a policy maker who has no informational avantage over the
private sector. I conclude in Section 2.6.
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2.2 Model
The model is a slight variant of the standard business cycle model with mo-
nopolistic competition. There is a continuum of islands indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. Each
island consists of a continuum of consumers and a representative monopolistically
competitive firm. There is perfect symmetry of information across agents on the
same island but asymmetries exist across islands which will be explained in detail
in the subsequent sub-sections.
There is perfect consumption insurance within the island, permitting the ex-
istence of a representative household on each island. From here on, I shall refer to
the representative household on island i as household i and the representative firm
on island i as firm i. Household i owns and operates firm i. Thus, the household
owns the claims to the firm’s profit. There are incomplete markets across islands,
i.e. households do not have access to a full set of Arrow securities. Households on
each island accumulate capital, which they rent to firms on other islands through a
centralized capital market. Labor is immobile across across islands. Thus, the only
way islands can insure against island-specific risk is by investing in capital.
The monopolistically competitive firm on island i produces variety Yi using
capital and labor. It hires labor only from the island i labor market at wage ωi,t.
However, it rents capital from an economy-wide capital market at the rental rate r.











Consumption and investment is in terms of the final good which is also the nu-
meraire.4
2.2.1 Exogenous Shocks to the Economy
Agents on island i in the economy are hit by both aggregate and idiosyncratic
shocks. As in the standard business cycle literature, aggregate productivity in the
economy varies over time. Productivity on each island is denoted by zi,t which is
comprised of two components, zt and ei,t:
ln zi,t = ln zt + ln ei,t
where zt is the aggregate component of productivity, which follows a mean reverting
process:
ln zt = ρz ln zt−1 + vt , vt ∼ N(0, σ2v) (2.1)
and ei,t is island specific idiosyncratic productivity. I assume ln ei,t ∼ N(0, σ2e) is
i.i.d across time and satisfies an adding up constraint:
∫ 1
0
ln ei,tdi = 0,∀t (2.2)
Agents on island i can observe zi,t but not its individual components.





. In the absence of a nominal anchor, this price Pt is undetermined. Hence,
without loss of generality, I set Pt = 1, ∀t.
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At the beginning of period t, the total capital stock available for production
is given by Kt + ζt, where ζt ∼ N(0, σ2ζ ) is an aggregate shock to the availability of
capital and is i.i.d across time. These shocks are not directly observed by agents.
Agents can infer the realization of the shocks by observing the rental rate of capital.
Shocks to the supply of capital may be seen as agents from outside the economy
investing or supplying capital at the beginning of the period. These agents must
be compensated for the use of their capital at the end of their period. Such shocks
are common in the market micro-structure literature such as Grossman and Stiglitz
(1980) and also in macro-finance literature such as Singleton (1987). This shock
implies that prices such as the rental rate do not fully reveal the true state of
aggregate productivity to agents. On observing a higher rental rate of capital,
agents cannot conclude that this is due to a higher aggregate productivity as it
could be due to a negative shock to the supply of capital available to firms. This
shock is introduced as more of a modeling tool to ensure that prices do not reveal
the true state of the economy, and the volatility of this shock can be set to a very
low number to remove other direct effects it has on the economy.




addition, denote εti = {εi,t−s}∞s=0 as the sequence of all realizations of εi through
period t. Similarly, εt = {εt−s}∞s=0 denotes the complete history of ε through period
t. From this point forth, I shall refer to εt as the true aggregate fundamentals of the
economy and to εti as the true fundamentals for island i.
5 Agents on island i do not
5Knowing εi,t is sufficient for agents to infer the realizations of the aggregate component of
productivity, the island specific component of productivity, the shock to the supply of capital.
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observe εi,t or εt and try to infer them using both endogenously and exogenously
generated information. As is standard in the business cycle literature, I assume
that the innovations are mutually independent. The unconditional distribution of
εi,t follows a normal distribution, εi,t ∼ N(0,Σ), where Σ is a diagonal matrix.6
The timing of events is as follows. For convenience, I divide each period
into two sub-periods, which are labeled the “pre-production” phase and the “post-
production” phase. In the pre-production stage of period t, firms and households on
island i observe island-specific productivity zi,t and an exogenous signal of aggregate
productivity ϕt, which is defined in the next sub-section. A shock to the supply of
capital ζt is realized but not observed. This shock can temporarily increase or
decrease the supply of capital to firms. Agents on island i also observe the rental
rate for capital, rt. Agents on an island use information from various sources to
try and infer the true fundamentals of the economy. Given its inferences of the
fundamentals of the economy, household i decides how much labor to supply, as
well as how much to consume and invest. Actual Investment is a an ex-post residual
and ensures that the budget constraint of the household is satisfied. Firm i decides
how much labor to hire from the local labor market and the how much capital to rent
from the economy-wide capital market. As firm i does not know the true aggregate
state of the economy at the time it chooses its inputs, this implies that aggregate
output/demand Yt and actual demand for a firm’s output Yit are unknown.
7. Once
the firms and households finish making their decisions, the “pre-production” phase
6Even though Σ is assumed to be a diagonal matrix, the setup is flexible enough to allow for
any structure of contemporaneous correlation.
7See Section 2.2.4 for more details.
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ends. In the next phase, all firms undertake production, and relative prices of each
variety, {pi,t}i∈[0,1], adjust to clear markets. Firms observe the realization of the
relative price pi,t of their own variety and pay out dividends/issue equity. This ends
the “post-production” phase. The timeline is summarized in Figure 2.1.
2.2.2 Information Structure
A key deviation of this model from the standard business cycle literature is that
agents cannot observe the shocks hitting the economy, i.e. agents cannot observe
εi,t directly. The economy is divided into a continuum of informationally isolated
partitions or “islands” (Lucas Jr., 1972). There is perfect symmetry of information
across agents on the same island but there is dispersion of information across islands.
Agents on each island possess some private information about the true fundamentals
of the economy. Since agents do not observe the true fundamentals of the economy,
they must form inferences about εi,t by looking at information available to them,
which originates from both endogenous and exogenous sources.
Exogenous sources of information are not affected by market interactions. In
the current model, this can be further divided into two sub-categories: private and
public. Private exogenous sources refer to the signals that agents on island i receive
about island specific productivity zi,t. In addition to these private exogenous signals,
each agent observes a noisy public signal of aggregate productivity.
ϕt = zt + ut (2.3)
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where ut ∼ N(0, σ2u) is an i.i.d. measurement error which is common across agents.
This signal is supposed to proxy for information that agents could get from non-
market signals. Define xexoi,t = {zi,t, ϕt}. Following Rondina and Walker (2012),
information originating from exogenous sources is labeled Ut(xexoi ) which denotes









































Endogenous sources of information are those which are influenced by market
interactions. In a setting with dispersed information, prices convey some of the
private exogenous information of other agents. This is because prices aggregate
information from decisions of other agents which are partly contingent on their
private information. In the current setting, at time t agent i can observe market-
consistent information, i.e. the history of all rental rates, rt, and the relative price
for variety i up to period t − 1, pi,t−1. Define xendi,t = {pi,t−1, rt}. Information from
endogenous sources can also be split into two categories: Vt(x) and Mt. Vt(xendi )
denotes the smallest closed sub-space spanned by current and past realizations of
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xendi,t . Mt captures the notion of rational expectations and the assumption that agents
know the equilibrium processes which generate xendt and x
exo
t . This component is
referred to as the cross-equation restrictions associated with rational expectations
equilibria.
The time t information of agents on island i is denoted by Ii,t:8
Ii,t = Ut(xexoi ) ∨ Vt(xendi ) ∨Mt (2.4)
Given the information set of agent i at time t, Et[· | Ii,t] ≡ Ei,t[·] denotes the
projection of a variable onto the information set Ii,t.9
Since agents do not observe shocks hitting the economy in an economy with
dispersed information, aggregate shocks like zt, ut and ζt are not present in agent
i′s information set. However, given their information sets, agents can forecast these
aggregate fundamentals. Let Ei,tzt represent an agent on island i’s forecast of con-
temporaneous aggregate productivity. I label the scenario where Ei,tzt > (<)zt as
agents on island i being optimistic (pessimistic) about aggregate productivity. Con-
sistent with this definition, I label the scenario where Etzt > (<)zt as the economy
as a whole being characterized by optimism (pessimism) about aggregate productiv-
ity. Etzt refers to the average belief about aggregate productivity in the economy.
The operator E is defined below. The definitions of pessimism and optimism are
8The operator ∨ is defined as follows: A∨B denotes the smallest closed sub-space which spans
the sub-spaces A and B.
9The projection will be defined more concretely in the linear economy defined in Section 2.3.
More precisely, the projection in the linear model is the linear projection operator which is equiv-




Definition 1. The economy is optimistic about X if
EtX > X
and is pessimistic about X if
EtX < X
where Et refers to the the average expectations operator and is defined below in
definition 2.
This definition is different from the definition of optimism and pessimism in
the news shocks literature. The news shock literature defines an exogenous pos-
itive signal about tomorrow’s fundamentals as optimism. However, optimism or
pessimism here refers to a phenomenon which is generated endogenously within the
model.
Definition 2. The average expectation of a random variable X across agents in the







t X is also referred to as the First-Order Expectation of X and represents
the first moment of the distribution of forecasts of X.
At this stage, it is useful to point out the differences in assumptions in the
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papers which are closely related to the current setup. Unlike this paper, Angeletos
and La’O (2008) assume that agents do not learn from endogenous signals, which
in terms of notation implies that Vt(xendi ) = {0} in their model. Graham and
Wright (2010) assume that agents only have access to market-consistent information,
i.e. endogenous public signals in the form of prices, which in terms of the current
notation implies that Ut(xexoi ) = {0} in their model. Some other recent papers like
Eusepi and Preston (2011) have also tried to explain business cycle fluctuations on
the basis of learning and expectations formation. The basic environment in these
papers is distinct from the current setup as they deviate from rational expectations
by assuming that agents do not have the knowledge contained in Mt. Agents in
these models try to learn about M over time. In the current setup, I stay within the
framework of rational expectations. Agents know the equilibrium pricing functions.
In fact, without the knowledge of these functions, they would not be able to filter as
much information out of the prices. Agents utilize the knowledge of these equilibrium
pricing functions to infer the true fundamentals, which play a part in determining
the equilibrium prices.
Notice that in the economy with dispersed information, each agent has an
independent private signal of the aggregate productivity:
ln zi,t = ln zt + ln ei,t (2.6)
If agents were able to share information, averaging the sequence of signals {zi,t}i∈[0,1]
across the agents would yield the true value of aggregate productivity, zt in that pe-
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riod and the model would become identical to the full information model.10 I assume
that there is no market for information where agents can explicitly trade their pri-
vate information. This is a reasonable assumption, as information markets do not
exist widely and the ones that do exist are not very deep. This is because there
is reason to believe that agents may strategically choose to withhold information.11
Despite the absence of an explicit market where agents can trade information, I al-
low agents in my model to learn about the private information of other agents from
their market interactions. In particular, prices in this setup provide information
about the private information of others, and hence the true fundamentals. Thus,
prices can potentially reveal the true state of the economy. However, as shown in
Section 2.3.2, prices fail to be fully informative because of the infinite regress in
expectations induced by the presence of dispersed information. Market incomplete-
ness is very important for this result to hold. If agents had access to a full set of
Arrow securities, the prices of those securities would provide information about the
true state of the economy and might reveal it to agents. If agents could recover the
true fundamentals of the economy by observing these prices, the economy would
converge to the symmetric full information case.
10This follows from the adding up constraint (2.2).
11There is a large literature studying the strategic motives that may cause agents to withhold
their private information. For example, Okuno-Fujiwara et al. (1990) show how agents holding
private information may strategically provide information which is less precise than their private
information. Another example is the “cheap talk” literature such as Crawford and Sobel (1982).




Household i chooses consumption, Ci,t, and labor supply, Hi,t, at the beginning
of the period and investment in capital Ki,t+1, is the residual. The timing described
above implies that at the beginning of period t, households observe the wage rate,
ωi,t, and the rental rate, rt. However, dividends are not paid to the household until
after production takes place and relative prices clear the markets. The household
is constrained in its choices of consumption and labor supply such that tomorrow’s
capital stock Ki,t+1 is non-negative for any realizations of Πi,t. The problem of the













Ci,t +Ki,t+1 = ωi,tHi,t + [1 + rt − δ]Ki,t + Πi,t
Ki,t+1 ≥ 0
where Πi,t refers to the profit of firm i. Ei,0[·] refers to the expectations conditional
on the information set of agent i at time 0. The optimality conditions for household









(1 + ν)Ci,t −ΨH1+νi,t
(1 + ν)Ci,t+1 −ΨH1+νi,t+1
]
[1 + rt+1 − δ]
}
, ∀ Πi,t (2.8)
The assumption of dispersed information can be seen in the fact that the expec-
tations of agent i are indexed by i since the information sets across islands are
heterogeneous. This implies that the agent uses his own beliefs to calculate ex-
pected benefits in the future from investing in capital. These beliefs differ across
islands.
2.2.4 Firms
There is a representative monopolistically competitive firm on island i which is
owned by the representative household on the island. Prices are flexible. The firm’s
objective is static and is to maximize expected dividend payments to its owner.
Firm i can only employ labor, Li,t, from the same island. Since the firm is the only
employer of labor on island i, it internalizes the fact that hiring more labor is going
to raise the wage rate.13 Firm i also rents capital, Ji,t, from an economy-wide rental
market at a rental rate rt, which it takes as given.
As per the standard Dixit-Stiglitz demand system, demand for a particular
13I assume that the firm internalizes the price effect in the labor market to introduce increasing
marginal costs in the firm’s production decision. It is well known that with a constant return to
scale production function and linear costs of hiring inputs, the cost minimization problem of a firm
yields a constant marginal cost function [see Mas-Colell et al. (1995, chapter 5) for details]. With
a Dixit-Stiglitz demand system, the iso-elastic demand curves with constant marginal cost do not
generate strategic complementarity in a firm’s output decision. However, if the firm internalizes
the price effect of hiring additional labor, its cost of hiring labor is no longer linear in labor and
is associated with increasing marginal costs [See equation 2.17]. This is sufficient to generate
strategic complementarity in the firm’s output decision. If the firm produces too little relative
to aggregate output, its realized relative price is too high and it could have increased profits by
producing slightly more; if it produces too much relative to aggregate output, increasing marginal
costs erode its profits.
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At the time of making its input decisions, a firm only observes its own productivity
and can neither observe nor infer the level of aggregate productivity. Consequently,
firms cannot infer the output of all other firms, and hence Yt is unknown. As such,
a firm must forecast the level of aggregate demand in choosing its level of output.
Thus, its input decisions depend on the perceived levels of aggregate demand. This
feature of the model arises because dispersed information prevents agents from infer-
ring the true fundamentals.14 Conversely, if firms have full information, they would
be able to compute Yt with certainty, and thus perceptions about output would not
matter. With dispersed information, uncertainty about productivity manifests itself
in the form of demand uncertainty even in a neoclassical model.
Once all firms have produced output and demands are realized, prices clear
markets. Thus, prices adjust to make the demand relationship hold ex-post. The
objective for the firm can be written as:
max
Li,t,Ji,t
















Equations (2.10) and (2.11) are the production technology of firm i and the ex-
post demand curve facing firm i, respectively. Equation (2.12) is the labor supply
on island i and is derived from equation (2.7) from the maximization problem of
household i. The solution to the firms’ problem can be characterized by demands











































































Equations (2.13) and (2.14) show that firm i’s decisions of how much labor and
capital to hire depend on its perception of aggregate output. Equation (2.15) shows
that a firm’s output responds not only to fundamentals but also to the firm’s percep-
tion of aggregate output/demand in the economy. A pessimistic view of aggregate
demand causes a firm to contract its output by scaling down its inputs. Thus, this
strictly neoclassical economy with no nominal rigidities displays Keynesian features
where firms respond to perceptions about the level of aggregate demand. This is







information. Hence, dispersed information coupled with strategic complementarity
in the firm’s output decision implies that perception of aggregate demand becomes
a state variable in the firm’s problem.















where mci,t(Q) is the marginal cost faced by firm i in period t to produce quantity


















Equation (2.16) shows that dispersed information leads to time-varying markups







t and the price is a constant markup
θ
θ−1 > 1 over
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marginal costs. This markup is associated with the dead-weight loss associated
with monopolistic competition. Imperfect information introduces a time-varying
component to the markup which depends on the ratio of the actual and perceived
level of aggregate demand.
2.2.5 Equilibrium
2.2.5.1 Labor Market Equilibrium
The firm on each island internalizes the labor supply curve when choosing the
amount of labor to hire. In equilibrium, Hi,t = Li,t ≡ Ni,t. The equilibrium level of

























2.2.5.2 Capital Market Equilibrium
At time t, the rental rate rt adjusts to equate the total supply of capital
Kt + ζt =
∫ 1
0
























= Kt + ζt (2.20)
where Λ = 1 + ν[α + θ(1− α)].
2.2.5.3 Goods Market Equilibrium
The relative price of each variety adjusts to clear the market. Aggregate
market clearing implies
Yt = Ct + It + (1 + rt − δ)ζt (2.21)





and It is the aggregate investment
It = Kt+1di− (1− δ)Ktdi
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and (1 + rt − δ)ζt represents the resources that are owed to the foreigners who lent
capital to the economy.
Definition 3 (Equilibrium). Equilibrium in the economy is defined as a set of se-
quences of allocations {{Ci,t, Hi,t, Ki,t+1, Ji,t, Li,t}i∈[0,1]}∞t=0, prices {rt, {ωi,t, pi,t}i∈[0,1]}∞t=0
and information sets {{Ii,t}i∈[0,1]}∞t=0 along with the sequence of exogenous processes
{zt, ζt, ut{ei,t}i∈[0,1]} such that the following conditions are true:
• The information sets {{Ii,t}i∈[0,1]}∞t=0 are defined by equation (2.4).
• {{Ci,t, Ki,t+1, Hi,t}∞t=0}i∈[0,1] satisfy equations (2.7) and (2.8) for each house-
hold i ∈ [0, 1] and thus, solve the problem of the household on island i ∈ [0, 1]
given the sequence of information sets {{Ii,t}i∈[0,1]}∞t=0.
• {{Li,t, Ji,t}∞t=0}i∈[0,1] satisfy equations (2.13) and (2.14) for each i ∈ [0, 1] and
solve firm i ∈ [0, 1]’s problem in each period given the sequence of information
sets {{Ii,t}i∈[0,1]}∞t=0.
• The sequence of equilibrium wage rates {{ωi,t}∞t=0}i∈[0,1] is determined by the
firm’s employment decision taking the labor supply curve as given. (Li,t = Hi,t)
each period on island i ∈ [0, 1] and must satisfy equation (2.19)
• The sequence of rental rates {rt}∞t=0 equates the total demand for capital by
firms Jt to the total supply of capital Kt + ζt every period, i.e. equation (2.20)
is satisfied ∀t.
• The sequences of relative prices for each variety i, {{pi,t}∞t=0}i∈[0,1] equate de-
mand and supply for each variety in every period, i.e. pi,t satisfies equation
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(2.11) ∀t.
• The resource constraint for the economy is satisfied ∀t, i.e. equation (2.21) is
satisfied at all times.
• Consistency requires the following
∫ 1
0
Ci,tdi = Ct∫ 1
0
Ki,t+1di = Kt+1∫ 1
0
Ji,tdi = Jt
2.3 The Linear Economy
From this point forth, I will focus exclusively on the log-linearized version of
the economy. This is to facilitate a tractable solution to the filtering problem.15 I
compute a log-linear approximation of the model around the non-stochastic steady
state with a degenerate distribution of capital. A detailed description of the steady
state is available in Appendix B.1. The equations describing the log-linearized
economy are presented in Appendix B.2. In the log-linearized economy, all hatted
variables are in terms of log deviations from their steady state values and variables
that are not hatted are deviations in levels from their steady state values.
15Agents in this model are permitted to learn from endogenous signals such as prices. In a
linearized model, prices are linear functions of the past and current innovations to the shocks in
the economy. Agents try to infer the innovations to these fundamentals of the economy by using
prices as signals. The filtering problem is made tractable by the fact that these signals are linear in
the innovations. A higher order approximation would result in prices depending not just linearly
on the innovations which makes the filtering problem much harder to solve.
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The structure of this section is as follows. First, in sub-section 2.3.1, I present
the equilibrium under the assumption of Full Information. Next, in sub-section 2.3.2,
I present the equilibrium of the model with dispersed information. This allows me
to contrast the predictions of the model under the two different assumptions on
information sets.
2.3.1 Full Information
It is standard in the business cycle literature to assume that agents observe
all contemporaneous shocks hitting the economy. Using the terminology of section
2.2.2, this implies that the exogenous sources of information at time t include the
realizations of {εi,t}i∈[0,1]. Notice that in the baseline case, the public signal of
productivity given by equation (2.3) is redundant as all agents observe aggregate
productivity without any noise.
Definition 4 (Information Set under Full Information). The information set
of any agent on island i at time t under the full information benchmark is given by:
Ii,t = IFIt = Ut({εj}j∈[0,1]) ∨Mt , ∀i ∈ [0, 1]
Following Whiteman (1983), I compute an equilibrium where the decisions of
agents on island i at time t are driven solely by the Gaussian process εti. Linearity
of the model along with the adding up constraint (2.2) ensure that the aggregate
allocations and prices depend only on the Gaussian process, εt. More precisely, this
means that the decision of agents on island i at time t lie in Hβt (εi) and aggregate
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quantities and economy-wide prices lie in Hβt (ε), where H
β
t (εi) and H
β
t (ε) denote
the space of time independent beta-summable linear combinations of current and
past realizations of εi and ε respectively. This restriction rules out the existence of
sunspots and ensures the existence of a unique solution. Thus, I ignore the noisy
public signal for the rest of this subsection.
In the benchmark economy, all agents in the economy are assumed to have
symmetric information, implying that they form the same expectation of future
fundamentals.
Et[X] ≡ E[X | Ii,t] = E[X | IFIt ] , ∀i ∈ [0, 1]
where X is any random variable. The forecast by any agent in the economy of a
random variable X is given by E[X | It], which refers to the linear projection of the
random variable X onto It. Since innovations εi,t are assumed to be jointly normal,
the linear projections correspond to conditional expectations.
The problem of the household and the firm under the benchmark case is iden-
tical to the one described in section 2.2.3 along with the additional assumption that
all agents have the same information set. The full information equilibrium can be
summarized by the following propositions. Details can be found in Appendix B.3.
Proposition 6 (Decisions made by agents on island i).
• The labor supply and capital accumulation decisions of the household on island
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K̂i,t+1 = Ki,t −
αβΨν(θ − 1)H1+ν







αν(1− β)(θ − 1)ΨH1+ν





































(1 + ν[α + θ(1− α)])K
]
βẑi,t (2.23)
• The representative firm on island i’s demands for labor and capital and its
output are given by:
L̂i,t =
(θ − 1)ẑi,t
1 + ν[α + θ(1− α)]
− α(θ − 1)r̂t
1 + ν[α + θ(1− α)]
+
Ŷt
1 + ν[α + θ(1− α)]
(2.24)
Ĵi,t =
(θ − 1)(1 + ν)ẑi,t
1 + ν[α + θ(1− α)]
− [1− α + θ(α + ν)]r̂t
1 + ν[α + θ(1− α)]
+
(1 + ν)Ŷt




1 + ν[α + θ(1− α)]
− αθ(1 + ν)r̂t
1 + ν[α + θ(1− α)]
+
(1 + αν)Ŷt
1 + ν[α + θ(1− α)]
(2.26)
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Proof. See Appendix B.3
Proposition 7 (Aggregate Quantities and Prices).
• Aggregate Capital stock evolves according to the following law of motion:
K̂t+1 = λkK̂t + λz ẑt + λζζt (2.27)
where λk, λz and λζ are constants and are defined in Appendix B.3.






















Proof. See Appendix B.3
Equations (2.24)-(2.26) demonstrate that the decisions of firm i are driven
solely by the realized level of productivity on island i, the rental rate r̂t and actual
aggregate output Ŷt. Since all agents have the same ‘correct’ belief, all decisions of
agents in the full information economy are driven by changes in fundamentals and
there is no room for fluctuations caused by sentiments. It is straightforward to see
that this economy is characterized by constrained efficiency.
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2.3.2 Dispersed Information
As was explained earlier, agents on island i have access to various exogenous
and endogenous sources of information. The endogenous sources of information are
prices in the markets in which agents from island i participate, i.e. the rental rate
r̂t and the relative price of variety i from last period, p̂i,t−1.
Proposition 8 (Information contained in prices). .
1. Upon observing the realized relative price, p̂i,t−1 at the end of t − 1, a firm can
infer aggregate output Ŷt−1 without any error.
2. Wages ωi,t on island i provide the agents on the island with no additional infor-
mation since labor markets are local.
Firms at the time of making their output decisions do not know the actual level
of aggregate demand. As a result, they do not know the market clearing relative
price for their product with certainty. However, the market clearing relative price is
revealed after all firms have produced. At this juncture, each firm is able to observe
only its’ own product’s relative price. The ex-post demand curve facing each firm i
at the end of period t− 1 is given by
Ŷi,t−1 = −θp̂i,t−1 + Ŷt−1
Thus, given Ŷi,t−1, observing the relative price p̂i,t−1 is the same as observing Ŷt−1.
Thus, from now on I treat Ŷt−1 as the signal instead of p̂i,t−1. From now on I shall
refer to the vector of signals at time t as xi,t = (ẑi,t, ϕt, r̂t, Ŷt−1).
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Definition 5. In the economy with dispersed information, the information set of
agents on island i at time t is given by:
Ii,t = Ui,t(ẑi,t, ϕt) ∨ Vt(r̂t, Ŷt−1) ∨Mt
Given an information set, the expectation of any random variable X by agent
i, denoted by Ei,tX, refers to the linear projection of X on to Ii,t. Given that the
shock process εt is Gaussian in this setup, these linear projections correspond to the
conditional expectations. Since Ii,t 6= Ij,t, in general Ei,tX 6= Ej,tX.
Solving a dynamic model in which agents learn from endogenous signals is not
trivial. In models with only exogenous noisy sources of information, the agent’s
problem of filtering this information can be solved independently of their economic
decisions. This is because economic decisions do not affect the structure of infor-
mation available to agents. This is the case in models such as Angeletos and La’O
(2008) where agents only learn from exogenous sources of information.
However, if agents are learning from prices, this is no longer the case. As
was discussed in section 2.2.2, prices aggregate the decisions of other agents, which
are partly contingent on their private information. Hence, prices provide provide
a summary of the private information of other agents. Prices affect the economic
decisions agents make and are in turn affected by these economic decisions. Thus,
agents’ inference problem cannot be solved independently of their economic deci-
sions. Moreover, the quality of information available from prices depends on which
signals agents put more weight on when making their decisions. In turn, weight
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agents put on prices as a source of information depends on the quality of informa-
tion they provide. This implies that the quality of information available from prices
is determined endogenously within the model by the decisions of all agents.
I show that in such a setting, price will not provide perfectly precise signals
of the true fundamentals, and that agents are therefore unable to infer the true
fundamentals εi,t from the sequence of all realized pubic and private information.
Solving the model requires me to fully determine the behavior of agents and the
informational content of prices. I follow a two step procedure. First, I solve the
problem of the firm and household on each island i ∈ [0, 1], taking as given the in-
formational content of prices. This induces a particular information set for agents on
island i, Ii,t. Agents make decisions measurable with respect to this information set.
Prices then aggregate these decisions and the informational content of these prices
can be determined. Consistency requires that the realized informational content of
prices be the same as the initial assumption. This approach is operationalized in
the following subsections. The full solution is presented in Appendix B.2.
For the ease of exposition define the two vectors ξi,t = {vt, ut, ζt, ei,t} and
ξt = {vt, ut, ζt, 0}. Notice that ξt =
∫ 1
0
ξi,tdi. Similar to the full information section,
I compute the unique equilibrium under which agents decisions lie in Hβt (ξi) and
aggregates and prices lie inHβt (ξ), following the adding up constraint. Agents cannot
observe the true fundamentals and infer the true fundamentals from their various
sources of information, which include the noisy signal about aggregate productivity.
Thus, I allow for agents decisions to not just depend on εti but also on {ut−j}∞j=0.
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2.3.2.1 Step 1: The Decision of Agents given the informational con-
tent of prices
In this subsection, I fix the informational content of prices and solve for the
decisions of these agents. The decisions of households i under information set Ii,t
are summarized by the following proposition.
Proposition 9. The labor supply and capital accumulation decisions of the house-
hold on island i are summarized below:
νĤi,t = ω̂i,t (2.30)
∆K̂i,t+1 = −
αβν(θ − 1)ΨH1+ν
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Proof. See Appendix B.2.
The labor supply decision is identical to the one under full information. How-
ever, there is a subtle difference in the savings decision under dispersed information.
Notice that the savings decision in part depends on the expected benefit to holding
a unit of capital in the future. Under dispersed information, this expected benefit is
with respect to the beliefs of household i. These beliefs in general are different from
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those of household j and different from the objective full-information belief. This
opens the door for fluctuations in investment depending on perceptions. If house-
hold i is pessimistic about the benefit of holding a unit of capital in the future, it
cuts back on investment. In the same vein, if all agents are pessimistic about the
benefit of holding capital in the future, they all cut back on their investment, and
this leads to a reduction in capital stock tomorrow. Thus pessimism can lead to
swings in investment behavior.
Dispersed information also alters the firm’s decisions compared to the full in-
formation case. The decisions of firm i are summarized in the following proposition.




1 + ν[α + θ(1− α)]
− α(θ − 1)r̂t
1 + ν[α + θ(1− α)]
+
Ei,tŶt
1 + ν[α + θ(1− α)]
(2.32)
Ĵi,t =
(θ − 1)(1 + ν)ẑi,t
1 + ν[α + θ(1− α)]
− [1− α + θ(α + ν)]r̂t
1 + ν[α + θ(1− α)]
+
(1 + ν)Ei,tŶt
1 + ν[α + θ(1− α)]
(2.33)
Consequently, the output decision of firm i can be expressed as:
Ŷi,t =
θ(1 + ν)ẑi,t
1 + ν[α + θ(1− α)]
− αθ(1 + ν)r̂t
1 + ν[α + θ(1− α)]
+
(1 + αν)Ei,tŶt
1 + ν[α + θ(1− α)]
(2.34)
Proof. See Appendix B.2
Equations (2.32)-(2.34) show that the output decision of firm i is characterized
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by strategic complementarity. The input demand and output decisions of the firm
depend on its perception of aggregate demand, Ei,tŶt. This result is presented
formally in the following Lemma.
Lemma 4. Firm i’s demand for inputs is increasing in its perception of aggre-






1 + ν[α + θ(1− α)]
> 0 (2.35)
i.e., a firm’s output decision is characterized by strategic complementarity.
Proof. The claim follows from (2.34).
This strategic complementarity in output implies that the firm wants to hire
more labor and capital when it perceives the level of aggregate demand to be high.
This can be seen from equations (2.32) and (2.33). At the time of making production
decisions, firm i does not know the true fundamentals, and thus it cannot predict
with certainty the decisions of the other firms. As a result, it cannot ascertain
the exact level of aggregate demand Ŷt. Since the profits of the firm depend on
its relative output, uncertainty about fundamentals manifests itself in the form
of demand uncertainty. Each firm must decide how much to produce given its
perception of aggregate demand rather than actual aggregate demand.
In an economy with dispersed information where agents’ individual decisions
are affected by their perceptions of the fundamentals, aggregate quantities depend
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on the distribution of beliefs across the economy. In particular, average perceptions
about the fundamentals affect the aggregate quantities.
Proposition 11. Aggregate capital accumulation by agents in the economy depends
on average perceptions of the state of the economy:
∆K̂t+1 = −
αβν(θ − 1)ΨH1+ν
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and so do the total demands for labor and capital:
L̂t =
(θ − 1)ẑt
1 + ν[α + θ(1− α)]
− α(θ − 1)r̂t
1 + ν[α + θ(1− α)]
+
EtŶt
1 + ν[α + θ(1− α)]
(2.37)
Ĵt =
(θ − 1)(1 + ν)ẑt
1 + ν[α + θ(1− α)]
− [1− α + θ(α + ν)]r̂t
1 + ν[α + θ(1− α)]
+
(1 + ν)EtŶt
1 + ν[α + θ(1− α)]
(2.38)
Consequently, so do aggregate output and prices:
Ŷt =
(1− α)EtŶt
1− α + θ(α + ν)
+
θ(1 + ν)ẑt
1− α + θ(α + ν)
+
αθ(1 + ν) (Kt + ζt)





1− α + θ(α + ν)
+
(θ − 1)(1 + ν)ẑt
1− α + θ(α + ν)
−{1 + ν[α + θ(1− α)]} (Kt + ζt)
1− α + θ(α + ν)
(2.40)
Proof. Aggregating equation (2.31) over all households yields equation (2.36), while
aggregating equation (2.34) over all firms yields equation (2.39). Equations (2.37)-
(2.38) can be derived by aggregating equations (2.32)-(2.33). Equation (2.40) can
be derived by aggregating equation (2.33) and imposing capital market clearing
Ĵt = K̂t + ζt.
Proposition 11 is in strong contrast to Proposition 7. In the full information
case, aggregate quantities and prices do not depend on average perceptions about
the state of the economy and are driven purely by fundamentals. Equations (2.39)-
(2.40) highlight that the distribution of beliefs is also a force in determining the
behavior of aggregate quantities and prices in an economy with dispersed infor-
mation. In particular, equation (2.39) shows that aggregate output is affected by
average beliefs about aggregate demand. A higher average expectation about the
level of aggregate demand results in an increase in actual output. If all firms are
optimistic (pessimistic) about the level of aggregate demand, they will choose to
produce more (less). This reliance of actual output on the perceived level of output
acts like an amplification mechanism. In the previous section, firm i was able to
observe the productivity of each of the firms in the economy, and as a result, it could
ascertain with certainty the output decisions of these firms. Therefore, its decision
of how much to produce only depended on actual aggregate demand and not on
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perceived aggregate demand.






1− α + θ(α + ν)
> 0
Proof. The claim follows from equation (2.39).
Similarly, equation (2.36) shows how pessimism and optimism can affect out-
put in the future. Investment at time t depends on perceptions about current and
future aggregate demand as well as average perceptions about the return from hold-
ing capital tomorrow. Average perception of a low return to capital induces agents
to invest less, which implies that the capital stock tomorrow is smaller and hence
the production possibility frontier for tomorrow moves inwards. Pessimistic average
beliefs about the return from holding capital can arise from pessimistic beliefs about
aggregate demand today. Pessimistic beliefs about aggregate demand today cause
firms to cut back on their demand for capital, which reduces the rental rate today.
A low rental rate today is indicative of a low return to capital in the near future as
productivity is persistent. This results in a cut back on investment spending. Fluc-
tuations to perceptions not driven by shocks to fundamentals can thus cause current
and future aggregate output to contract or expand depending on the average beliefs
today. This is the dynamic mechanism through which dispersed information acts to
make downturns longer and deeper. Other macro models of dispersed information
such as Angeletos and La’O (2008) do not focus on this dynamic mechanism as they
abstract from capital or any other persistent endogenous state variable.
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Lorenzoni (2009) shows how nominal rigidities combined with non-fundamental
fluctuations in beliefs can have dynamic effects on output. This paper highlights
that non-fundamental fluctuations in beliefs can have dynamic persistent effects
even in a neoclassical rational expectations economy with no nominal rigidities or
other explicitly Keynesian features. Dispersed information results in a neoclassical
economy displaying a Keynesian flavor, in that both perceptions about aggregate
demand determine and the actual output in the economy. The average expectations
are analogous to the Keynesian idea of animal spirits. Section 2.4 fleshes out how
such optimism or pessimism may arise.
2.3.2.2 Step 2: Filtering and prediction problem
The previous sub-section provided a solution to an agent’s problem taking as
given the informational content of prices. This section pins down the informational
content of prices as an equilibrium object. As is clear from the propositions in
the previous section, agents’ decisions depend on their perception of how prices
and aggregate demand evolve in the future. Equations (2.30)-(2.34) imply that the






j+1Ŷt+j and Ŷt in
order to make an investment decision. These predictions are the linear projections
of these objects onto Ii,t. More generally, these projections are linear combinations
of past and current realizations of the signals {xi,t−s}∞s=0, which themselves are
functions of the past and current innovations to the shocks {ξi,t−s}∞s=0. Thus, without
loss of generality, we can assume that the predictions are linear combinations of past
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and current ξi’s.
3.2.2.1 Technical discussion of the difficulty in solving dispersed information models
.
Solving the model requires one to solve the prediction problem of an agent
with information set Ii,t. The problem of infinite regress in expectations is well
known since Townsend (1983). Prices and future aggregate demand depend on
the decision rules of all agents in the economy, who make output and investment
decisions in the presence of private information. As a result, the distribution of
beliefs plays an important role in determining the aggregates of the economy. To be
able to predict prices, capital stock and output in the future, agents must forecast
the private information available to the other agents. This leads to the problem of
infinite regress and makes the state space explosive. For example, consider firm i’s
output decision in period t. In order to decide on the level of output to produce,
firm i must predict the level of aggregate demand Ŷt. Applying the expectation
operator to equation (2.39), we have:
Ei,tŶt =
θ(1 + ν)Ei,tẑt
1 + ν[α + θ(1− α)]
− αθ(1 + ν)r̂t
1 + ν[α + θ(1− α)]
+
(1 + αν)Ei,tEtŶt
1 + ν[α + θ(1− α)]
(2.41)
However, this depends on agent i’s expectation of the average expectations of aggre-
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Ei,tEtŶtdi is the average expectation of the average expectation
of aggregate output. Plugging this equation into equation (2.41) shows that agent
i’s expectation of aggregate output depends his expectation of both the average ex-
pectations of aggregate productivity and also the average expectation of the average
expectation of aggregate output. This implies that agent i’s expectation of aggre-
gate demand depends on the second order average expectations. In fact, if we repeat
the above procedure to substitute higher order expectations, we will find that firm
i’s belief about aggregate output and hence the decision of how much to produce
depend on the entire set of higher order beliefs about aggregate productivity:
Ei,tŶt =
θ(1 + ν)









t ẑt . . .
− αθ(1 + ν)r̂t
1 + ν[α + θ(1− α)]− θ(1 + ν)
(2.42)
Since firms are symmetric, aggregate output depends on the entire set of higher
order expectations about aggregate output:
Ŷt =
θ(1 + ν)









t ẑt . . .
− αθ(1 + ν)r̂t
1 + ν[α + θ(1− α)]− θ(1 + ν)
(2.43)
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Note that the notation E
n
t implies the average expectations of order n. We can
define E
(n)












t ẑt = ẑt
The problem stated above is not tractable as it is easy to see that it gives rise to an
infinite dimensional state space. Agents need to track an infinite number of objects
{E(n)t ẑt}∞n=0. Standard techniques of filtering, used in incomplete information mod-
els, such as the standard Kalman Filter, are ill-suited for such a problem as they
require a well defined finite dimensional state space. Other recent papers have come
across a similar problem. Woodford (2002) deals with this infinite regress problem
by using a clever technique which allows him to predict only a finite number of
objects. In particular, Woodford (2002) restricts agents to only learn from exoge-
nously generated signals, which allows him to employ the above strategy and still
use the Kalman Filter. However, this technique cannot be generalized to models
in which agents learn from endogenous signals as the convergence properties of the
standard Kalman filter are not straightforward. Graham and Wright (2010) extend
the Kalman Filter to handle endogenous signals and use the technique suggested
in Nimark (2010), which involves truncating the higher order beliefs at some large
order k < ∞. Thus, rather than tracking {E(n)t ẑt}∞n=0, the solution truncates the
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higher order beliefs up to k. As a result, {E(n)t ẑt}kn=0 are the state variables of
the model. Since, k is finite, this allows the definition of a finite dimensional state
space and use of the Kalman Filter. However, this is a computationally intensive
procedure.
The problem of having to track higher order expectations stems from private
information. The decisions of agents depend on their expectations of current and
future aggregate quantities and prices. However, agents are informed differentially
about the fundamentals today, implying that their forecasts of these objects are
also heterogeneous. Since agents cannot infer the true fundamentals today without
error, their perceptions about productivity, aggregate demand and so on depend
on all the past signals they observe. As agents use all past and current signals to
infer the fundamentals today, perceptions about fundamentals depend potentially
on the entire history of shocks. These decisions are then aggregated to form the
rental rate, which consequently also depends on the entire history of realizations of
ξ. Previous papers have dealt with this problem by assuming that all information
becomes common knowledge after a certain lag, as in Hellwig (2002) and Lorenzoni
(2009). Nimark (2010) shows that these truncation techniques may inadvertently
alter the properties of the equilibrium.
In this paper, I use techniques suggested by Kasa (2000) to deal with the
infinite regress in expectations. Kasa (2000) shows how to translate the problem
into the frequency domain, where the filtering problem is no longer infinite dimen-
sional, allowing one to compute an exact solution. In addition, Wiener-Kolmogrov
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forecasting methods can be used to project prices and output in the future onto
the information sets of agents in a tractable fashion, as this technique does not
require a well-defined state space. The current paper adapts this method to solve
for equilibrium. This is a methodological contribution; to my knowledge no existing
work adapts frequency-domain methods to the solution of business cycle models
with dispersed information.
3.2.2.2 Solution to the filtering problem .
Following Kasa (2000), I transform the problem into the frequency domain and
use techniques adapted from Whiteman (1983) to compute a rational expectations
equilibrium. A detailed explanation can be found in Appendix B.2.5. Solving the
model requires one to calculate an agent’s expectations of the fundamentals today
and in the future. The procedure to compute the equilibrium is explained below in
brief.
The decisions of households and firms depend on the perceived level of aggre-
gate demand. The perceptions of aggregate demand on island i depend potentially
on all past and current signals observed on the island. These signals are in turn
functions of current and all past fundamentals. Thus, without loss of generality
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assume that agent i’s perception of aggregate demand, Ei,tŶt, is given by
16
Ei,tŶt = Yv(L)vt + Yu(L)ut + Yζ(L)ζt + Ye(L)ei,t ≡ Y(L)ξi,t (2.44)
which in turn implies that average perception in the economy about aggregate de-
mand takes the following form:
EtŶt = Yv(L)vt + Yu(L)ut + Yζ(L)ζt ≡ Y(L)ξt (2.45)
where {Yj(L)}j∈{v,u,e,ζ} are potentially infinite order beta-summable lag polynomi-
als.
The capital accumulation decisions of households on each island depend on
their own perception about the current and future state of the economy. As a
result, the aggregate capital stock depends on average beliefs, which in turn depend
on the realizations of all past and current realizations of ξ. In particular, assume
that aggregate capital evolves according to the following process:
Kt+1 = Kv(L)vt +Ku(L)ut +Kζ(L)ζt (2.46)
where Kv and Ku are potentially infinite order beta-summable lag polynomials.
The lag polynomials {Kj(L),Yj(L)}j∈{v,u,e,ζ} need to be determined in equilibrium.
16The structure imposed on the predicted values implicitly assumes that the equilibrium is sym-
metric. The functions defining the perceptions are identical across islands, i.e. the lag polynomials
do not have an i subscript. Since the perceptions of agents on island i depend potentially on
the entire history of shocks, recursive filtering techniques which require a well defined state space
become harder to apply.
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Given the guesses in equations (2.44)-(2.46), the perceived law of motion of rental
rates and aggregate output can be defined using by plugging in equations (2.44)-
(2.46) into equations (2.39) and (2.40).17
If rental rates were fully revealing, agents would be able to infer the current
fundamentals εt by observing it. But as is shown in the next section, agents will not
be able to infer the current fundamentals by observing their set of signals. However
they are able to infer some convolution of current fundamentals with the past funda-
mentals. These combinations of past and current fundamentals are determined by
deriving an observationally equivalent fundamental Wold representation of equation
(2.47) below. The procedure follows Rozanov (1967) and is explained in Appendix
B.2.5. This also allows one to pin down the information contained in prices.
The next step of the solution involves taking these perceived laws of motion
as given and computing the decisions of households and firms. Aggregating these
decisions yields actual laws of motion of the aggregate capital stock, output, rental
rates and perceived aggregate demand. Rational expectations implies that the actual
and perceived laws of motions should be consistent with each other. This implies
that the perceived laws of motion have to be matched with the actual derived ones.
This completes the procedure, which identifies the unique equilibrium in Hβt (ξ).
2.4 Results
This section characterizes the exact linear equilibrium of the dispersed in-
formation economy and contrasts its properties to the full information case. The
17These are given by equations (B.2.18)-(B.2.19) in Appendix B.2.5.
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numerical results are based the following calibration. The period in the model is set
to one quarter. Parameters that govern preferences and production technology are
calibrated to match long-run values of postwar US aggregates. I follow standard cal-
ibration procedures as explained in Prescott (1986) and Cooley and Prescott (1995).
The discount factor β is set to 0.99 to match an annual interest rate of 4%. The
share of capital in total output, α, is set to 0.4 to match the labor share in national
income. The parameter Ψ, which scales disutility of labor, is set to set match labor
supply to 31% of the time in steady state. Following Fernandez-Villaverde et al.
(2009), I set ν to 1.35 to match a Frisch elasticity of labor supply of 0.74. The
persistence of the aggregate component of productivity ρz is set to 0.95, and the
standard deviation of the innovation to aggregate productivity σv, is set to 0.007.
I set the standard deviation of idiosyncratic productivity shocks σe to 0.1. This is
consistent with Castro et al. (2011), who find that mean standard deviation of firm
level productivity is within the range of 8-10 percent. I set the elasticity of substitu-
tion across different varieties θ to 10 to match a steady state markup of 10 percent.
δ is set to 0.025 to match a quarterly depreciation rate 2.5%. I set the volatility of
the noise shock σu to 2.1% which is consistent with the findings of L’Huillier et al.
(2009).
2.4.1 Informationally Inefficient Prices
This section shows that in the economy with dispersed information, households
and firms on island i ∈ [0, 1] are unable to infer the true fundamentals εi,t at time t
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from their signals xi,t.
Writing the signals available to agents on island i in their innovations repre-
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where {Rj,Yj} are defined in equations (B.2.18)-(B.2.19) in Appendix B.2.5. Since
Det[M(z)] = 0 at z = 0, εi,t is not fundamental for xi,t andM(L) does not possess
an inverse only in positive powers of L. Since in equation (2.47) is not a funda-
mental Wold representation, agent i cannot infer the contemporaneous shocks ξi,t
to the economy from observing all the past and current realizations of the signals
{xi,t−j}∞j=0.
Notice that the above equation is a mapping of the signals in terms of all the
past and current realization of fundamentals along with noise for agents on island i.
If price were fully revealing, agents would have been able to infer ξi,t by observing
the realizations of the signals xi,t up to period t. However, in this case, agents are
no longer able to infer ξi,t from the signals they observe. The agent has as many
signals as objects that he needs to infer, so this inability of agents to infer the true
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innovations to the economy is not because of not having enough signals.18 Rather,
prices are informationally inefficient because of the infinite regress in expectations.
Agents cannot observe the true fundamentals at the beginning of each period. As
a result they cannot infer aggregate demand/output. The rental rate rt provides
information about the current state of aggregate productivity but is convoluted by
the shock to the supply of capital, which is not observed by agents directly. Since
aggregate capital available today depends in part on investment decisions made last
period, it depends on the average expectations about the fundamentals in t−1. Thus,
to infer aggregate productivity from the rental rate an agent must infer the average
beliefs about fundamentals in t− 1. However, this is not a trivial exercise. Agents
on all islands learn from rental rates, and hence the average beliefs about current
fundamentals depend on the rental rate today. Note that average beliefs today
depend on the average beliefs yesterday through the rental rate. Hence average
belief in period t depends on all average beliefs in the past. Thus, market-consistent
information is governed by fundamentals not just from today but also from the
infinite past. This can be seen as arising from the infinite regress in expectations.
If information was not dispersed, agents could infer the true fundamentals about
aggregate productivity from observing the current rental rate, as they would know
what the average beliefs about fundamentals yesterday were.
Thus, in the economy with dispersed information, agents are unable to isolate
18Equation (2.47) is an infinite order VAR in innovations representation. The informational inef-
ficiency of prices is similar to the problems in interpreting VAR’s which are discussed in Fernandez-
Villaverde et al. (2007). They provide conditions under which an econometrician can infer the true
structural shocks from a VAR. The non-invertability ofM is synonymous with the failure of these
conditions. As a result, agents (who are doing the jobs of econometricians !) cannot infer the true
contemporaneous fundamentals εi,t.
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the effects of changes in fundamentals from noise. In fact, agents’ forecast errors in
predicting aggregate productivity are serially correlated:









− γuut−1 + γζζt−1
−γeei,t−1) (2.48)
Consequently, the average forecast error is serially correlated









− γuut−1 + γζζt−1) (2.49)
where {γj}j∈{v1,v2,u,ζ,e} are positive constants which depend on model parameters and
steady state values. Since forecast errors are serially correlated, agents’ forecasts
are characterized by waves of pessimism and optimism.
2.4.2 Response of the Economy to a Aggregate Productivity Shock
This section discusses the reaction of the economy to a negative innovation to
aggregate productivity.
On Impact Following a decrease in the aggregate productivity in period t, firm i
observes a lower realization of his island specific productivity zi,t and also of the noisy
public signal ϕt. The firm is unable to dis-entangle whether the lower observations
are driven by an actual fall in aggregate productivity or by some combination of
decreases in idiosyncratic productivity and noise. As a result, it tempers its beliefs
of a fall in aggregate productivity. In addition to these exogenous signals, the firm
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also observes the rental rate for capital, from which it tries to infer the perceptions
of others in the economy regarding aggregate productivity. A lower rental rate
reinforces the belief that productivity is low, and that average perception in the
economy about aggregate productivity is low, but since prices are not fully revealing,
firm i still cannot be fully certain that aggregate productivity has gone down. It
follows from equation (2.49) that the average perception of aggregate productivity
is higher than actual productivity.
Since the decline in perceived aggregate productivity is less than the actual
decline, demand for capital falls by less on impact compared to the full information
case. As a result, the rental rate falls by less. Nevertheless, a lower rental rate reaf-
firms that average perceptions about productivity are low. Each firm believes that
firms on other islands respond to lower average perceptions of aggregate productiv-
ity by decreasing production. Given the anticipated decline in production by firms
on other islands, the firm perceives that aggregate demand will be low. Strategic
complementarity in output decisions implies that firms will respond to lower per-
ceptions of aggregate demand by reducing their own output. Compared to the full
information case, firms in a dispersed information economy decrease output when
(1) they perceive aggregate productivity to be low and (2) when they perceive that
average beliefs of aggregate demand are also low. As such, Figure 2.2 highlights
that perceived aggregate demand falls on impact of a negative productivity shock.
Notably, the first panel of Figure 2.2 demonstrates the effect of strategic comple-
mentarity, since firms perceive aggregate demand to have declined, each firm lowers
its actual production. This causes actual aggregate output to fall by more than the
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Aggregate Output: Dispersed Information
Aggregate Output: Full Information
Figure 2.2: Evolution of Perceived Aggregate Demand and Actual Aggregate Output
after a negative productivity shock
decline in perceived aggregate demand. However, the decline in output is marginally
less severe initially compared to the fall in output in the full information economy as
demonstrated by the second panel in Figure 2.2. Following equation (2.39), agents
could not disentangle the true decline in aggregate productivity, and consequently
tempered expectations about the fall in aggregate demand causes output to decline
by less.
Since firms and households on an island are symmetrically informed, the house-
holds’ perception about aggregate productivity is also higher than the actual level
of productivity on impact. As productivity is persistent, households anticipate that
the demand for capital in t+1 will continue to be low and consequently they expect
the benefit from investing in capital to be low. As such, households cut back on
investment, which lowers the capital stock in the future.
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Dynamic Effects As shown above, a negative productivity shock has less effect
on economic activity on impact than in the full information case. However, the
negative impulse to productivity is amplified in subsequent quarters under dispersed
information, as can be seen in Figure 2.2.
Agents on each island are unsure about the extent of the fall in aggregate
productivity. Initially they attribute only a portion of the weak signals to a decrease
in aggregate productivity. At the end of period t, after production takes place
everyone observes aggregate output which is much lower than their expectations
which causes each agent to revise their expectations about aggregate productivity
downwards.
This is where pessimism has an impact. In the period following the initial
shock, the full information economy is already on its way to a recovery, as aggregate
productivity is mean reverting and starts to increase again. Each agent observes
this increase in aggregate productivity and this causes output, consumption and
investment to rebound. However, this is not the case in the economy with dispersed
information. In the dispersed information economy, each firm observes that its island
specific productivity has increased, and also a higher realization of the noisy public
signal than the previous period. However, on observing this information, each firm
still cannot infer whether the observed increase in productivity is particular to them
or whether others also observe similar signals. Each firm is cautious in increasing
their capital demand and hence output in response to this new information. Each
firm fears that other firms do not share this information and hence will not increase
their output, which will result in losses to the firm. As a result, each firm reacts
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cautiously to this new information, increasing their capital demand and hence their
output slightly.
Since each firm tempers its increased capital demand, the rental rate does not
increase enough to clearly reflect the improvement in productivity. Even though
each firm observes signals that suggest improvement in productivity, the relatively
small increase in the rental rate signals to each firm that the capital demand by other
firms is low. Consequently, each firm infers that all other firms are pessimistic. Since
each firm anticipates low aggregate demand, it lowers its own capital demand and
hence output. A lower realization of aggregate output then reaffirms the belief of
each firm that the others are pessimistic about aggregate productivity.
In other words, even though each firm observes signals of improving conditions,
they infer from the price signals that others do not share their good news about
improving conditions. As a result, each firm believes that the average perceptions
about aggregate productivity and hence aggregate demand/output are low. This
implies that the forecasts of all agents are negatively biased. The negatively biased
forecasts are what corresponds to pessimism in the economy. Thus, compared to
the full information economy where output started to recover immediately, output
in the dispersed information economy does not rebound as strongly. In fact, Figure
2.2 demonstrates that output in the dispersed information economy is below the
level of output in the full information economy in periods following the initial drop.
The presence of dispersed information and strategic complementarity implies
that each firm is cautious and hence slow in responding to new information that
others might not share. Prices which aggregate these decisions, are therefore also
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slow to reflect new information. Since prices are public sources of information, they
reinforce the pessimism/optimism, which causes agents to temper their decisions
further and hence further delays the incorporation of private information about im-
proving conditions into decisions and hence prices. Thus, a key component of the
mechanism is the reinforcing role played by the endogenous price signals. The mech-
anism is similar to that in Woodford (2002) where dispersed information interacts
with strategic complementarity in pricing to create delayed responses to a monetary
policy shock that is not common knowledge. However, a key difference is that since
Woodford (2002) does not feature learning from endogenous price signals, there is
no mechanism to reinforce the pessimism or optimism.
Dispersed information and strategic complementarity have dynamic as well as
static effects. Since households share the same information as firms, each households
also believes that there is a widespread sense of pessimism about aggregate pro-
ductivity in the economy, which results in lower aggregate demand/output. Since
aggregate productivity is persistent, they anticipate that this pessimism will also
persist over time, and hence predict that the demand for capital will be lower in the
future too. Anticipating a lower benefit from holding capital tomorrow, households
lower their investment expenditure today. This results in a lower capital stock in
the future, which causes the production possibility frontier to contract. This slows
down the recovery of output. A smaller capital stock and thus a higher rental rate
following a higher marginal productivity of capital tomorrow should encourage in-
vestment. However, the pessimistic beliefs about aggregate demand today result
in a negative wealth effect as households predict smaller dividends from each firm.
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Thus, this pessimism about the level of aggregate productivity and hence lower ag-
gregate demand/output causes income of households to decline giving rise to a fall in
consumption and in investment spending. Declines in investment and consumption
spending feed pessimistic beliefs about the state of aggregate demand which through
endogenous price signals reinforce more pessimism. The fall in consumption in the
dispersed information economy is smaller than the full information economy because
the incentive of households to invest falls drastically. This causes the recession to
be deeper and more protracted. Figure 2.3 summarizes the effect of a downward
revision in forecasts on investment and consumption and highlights that investment
falls by a much larger proportion in the dispersed information economy compared
to the full information economy.
The dispersed information economy features more volatile and persistent fluc-
tuations than its full information counterpart. In particular, output fluctuations
can result from both changes in fundamentals and changes in average perceptions
about fundamentals. Standard business cycle models predict a high correlation be-
tween productivity shocks and changes in output. This prediction is not supported
empirically. This correlation is attenuated in the dispersed information economy.
Output falls by less on impact of the technology shock and the recovery slower than
the subsequent improvement in technology due to lagging perceptions about funda-
mentals. In addition, the model is consistent with the strong empirical correlation
between consumer sentiment indices and short run fluctuations.
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Figure 2.3: Declines in Capital, Employment, Consumption after a negative pro-
ductivity shock
2.4.3 Response of the Economy to a Noise Shock
Angeletos and La’O (2008) and Lorenzoni (2009) discuss how noise that is
completely unrelated to the fundamentals of the economy can result in fluctuations
in economic activity in an economy with dispersed information with strategic com-
plementarity. I interpret the noise shock as the error ut in the public signal of
aggregate productivity ϕt. ut is assumed to be i.i.d across time. Noise shocks in this
setting have transient effects on economic activity. Figure 2.4 shows the responses
of output, rental rate, consumption and capital stock to a positive noise shock.
On impact of a positive noise shock, agents are unable to distinguish the shock
from an actual increase in productivity and hence attribute a part of signal to an
increase in aggregate productivity. Since the noise shock does not affect the fun-
damentals of the economy,it does not raise any firm’s island specific productivity
is unchanged. Thus, a typical firm infers that its idiosyncratic island specific pro-
ductivity shock has fallen along with a rise in aggregate productivity, leaving ẑi,t
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unchanged. Since firm i does not observe the island specific productivities of other
firms, it infers based on the higher noisy public signal that other firms are likely
to have observed higher island specific productivity and will increase production.
Strategic complementarity implies that firm i wants to align its production deci-
sions with others, and hence firm i increases capital and labor demand to increase
output.
Following equation (2.34), firm i tempers its increase in output as its own island
specific productivity hasn’t risen, even though it perceives aggregate demand/output
to have increased. If there had been an actual increase in aggregate productivity,
firm i would have observed both an increase in the public signals and its own is-
land specific productivity and would have responded more strongly in terms of the
increase in output.
Since firms are symmetric, the average firm observes no change in island spe-
cific productivity but infers that productivity has gone up on other islands. This
causes each firm to increase its capital demand and hence production, but to a lesser
extent than in the case of increasing productivity. Since each firm tempers its in-
crease in capital demand, rental rates do not increase as sharply as in the case where
there has been a true increase in aggregate productivity. Observing that the rental
rate did not respond strongly to the increase in the noisy public signal, each firm
cuts its forecast of aggregate productivity. This reinforces the incentive of a firm
to temper its increase in output. Since each firm increases its output only a little,
realized aggregate output does not rise substantially. At the end of the period, each
firm observes this small increase in aggregate output, and this again reinforces their
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Figure 2.4: Response to a positive noise shock
belief that aggregate productivity did not increase much in the first place.
In the next period, the average firm observes that its island specific productiv-
ity remains unchanged, while the noisy public signal reverts back to the steady state
level. This further suggests to the firm that there was in fact no change in aggregate
productivity in the previous period. Given that the firm recognizes that other firms
likely share the same beliefs, the effect of an initial noise shock dies out very quickly,
as can be seen in Figure 2.4. Thus, a noise shock leads only to a lukewarm initial
response in aggregate output which is not persistent.
The key reason why there is no persistent effect of noise in this setup is that
agents learn from prices, which are endogenous signals that inform agents about the
beliefs of others. The findings of this section suggest that prices are fairly good at
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eliminating fluctuations in an economy arising due to noise shocks. However, as was
clear from the previous sections, this was not the case when the economy was hit by a
productivity shock. In that case, the price signals actually reinforced the pessimistic
beliefs in the economy and resulted in more volatile fluctuations compared to the
full information case. Thus, this paper demonstrates that the efficiency with which
the pricing system aggregates information about the shocks affecting an economy
depends on the type of shock.
Earlier work such as Angeletos and La’O (2008) and Lorenzoni (2009) show
that noise shocks can cause expectation driven business cycle fluctuations. This
paper shows that pure exogenous noise shocks have only a transitory effect on the
economy once agents can learn from endogenous signals such as prices. Rather it is
the noisy informational content of endogenous price signals and the bias embedded in
them from correlated forecast errors that generate fluctuations based on sentiments.
2.5 Normative Analysis
To explore the normative implications of dispersed information, I first describe
the benchmark economy to which the decentralized economy is compared. Earlier
literature such as Angeletos and La’O (2010), Angeletos and Pavan (2009) and others
argue that comparing an economy with dispersed information to a full information
economy is not a sensible comparison. They argue that the appropriate benchmark
for comparison is one where agents still have to rely on their private information
to make their decisions but internalize the collective welfare of all agents in their
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decision making.
With the benchmark economy defined as above, it is still not trivial to define a
planner’s problem in this setup. Recent papers that deal with the normative impli-
cations of informational frictions, such as Adam (2007), Angeletos and La’O (2010),
Lorenzoni (2010) and Paciello and Wiederholt (2011), all assume the existence of
perfect consumption insurance across households and that all households have iden-
tical beliefs. This is not so in the current setup as there is imperfect consumption
insurance across islands, and in addition households on each island have different
beliefs. Thus, the planner’s problem which corresponds to the benchmark economy
as defined above takes the following form.
The planner maximizes the sum of expected utility of the households on each
island. The expected utility of each household is calculated with respect to their own
beliefs. In addition, the planner must make use of the capital market to engineer
redistribution. Thus, the planner’s problem is not the traditional one which is













































Ki,t+1 = Ki,t+1(Ii,t) , Hi,t = Hi,t(Ii,t) , Ji,t = Ji,t(Ii,t) (2.53)
Equation (2.50) represents the budget constraint of each household i and equation
(2.52) defines aggregate output. Equation (2.51) is the capital market clearing
condition and is the non-standard component in the planner’s problem, since the
planner is now restricted by a market in choosing allocations. The solution to the
planner’s problem provides the optimal allocations. As was the case in the earlier
sections, I solve the log-linear approximation around the steady state to the planner’s
problem. The steady state of solution to the planner’s problem is different from the
decentralized steady state defined in Appendix B.1. From now on, I shall refer to the
steady state of the planner’s problem as the undistorted steady state and the steady
state defined in Appendix B.1 as the distorted steady state. Appendix B.1.2 defines
the undistorted steady state. In the undistorted steady state, the monopolistic
wedge is absent. In addition, there is an additional wedge in the distorted steady
state between the marginal rate of substitution and the marginal product of labor
arising from the assumption that the firm internalizes the upward sloping labor
supply. This wedge is absent from the undistorted steady state as well.
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(2− θ)(1 + αν)
θ(1 + ν[α + θ(1− α)])
EtŶt . . .
+
θ(1 + ν)
1 + ν[α + θ(1− α)]
ẑi,t +
αθ(1 + ν)
1 + ν[α + θ(1− α)]
r̂t (2.54)
where C and H represent the undistorted steady state consumption and labor.
Aggregate output is given by:
Ŷt =
(1− α)EtŶt
1− α + θ2(α + ν)
+
θ2(1 + ν)ẑt
1− α + θ2(α + ν)
+
αθ2(1 + ν) (Kt + ζtK
−1)
1− α + θ2(α + ν)
(2.55)
A major difference between the planner’s allocations and the decentralized
economy is that the planner internalizes the effect of each firm’s output on total
output. As a result, a planner chooses to produce more and to reduce the monopo-
listic wedge. In addition, the planner reduces the effective strength of the strategic
complementarity by tempering the response of a firm’s output to changes in percep-
tions about aggregate demand.
Proposition 13. The response of aggregate output to changes in perceptions of
aggregate demand is smaller in the the planner’s solution than in the decentralized
economy.
Proof. It can be seen from equations (2.39) and (2.55) that in the planner’s solution,
the response of output to changes in average perceptions about aggregate demand
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as θ > 1.
In fact, given the calibration of the model, the planner would reduce the
responsiveness of aggregate output to changes in average beliefs by one order of
magnitude. The planner increases the responsiveness of output to aggregate pro-
ductivity and capital but these elasticities are of the same order of magnitude as in
the decentralized case.
To understand the planner’s motive, it is important to understand why the
planner seeks to reduce the degree of strategic complementarity in a firm’s output
decision. As was discussed earlier, the primary reason why recessions are more
persistent and why recoveries are inhibited is because of the interaction of dispersed
information and strategic complementarities in firms’ output decisions. In such a
setting, the firms do not incorporate new information in their decisions if they fear
that other firms do not share the same information. Since prices aggregate the
information from the decisions of agents, prices fail to reflect new information about
changing economic conditions. The above mechanism can also be seen in terms of an
information externality. The coordination motive amongst firms causes each firm
to place an inefficiently high weight on public information (prices) in making its
decisions and consequently to put too little weight on its private information. This
results in inefficiently low “production of information” as each agent puts too little
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weight on its private information. Agents put too much weight on prices, which are
reinforcing the pessimism/optimism in the first place. This is the main driver for
inefficiently (unconditionally)volatile and persistent fluctuations in the decentralized
economy.
To correct this information externality, the planner wants to impose a Pigou-
vian tax on the use of public information so as to align private incentives in infor-
mation use with the social incentives. By increasing the weight on private signals,
the planner is indirectly increasing the informational content of prices. This can
be seen as an increase in the signal to noise ratio in the price signal as not a lower
weight is assigned to past innovations which implies a lower part of total variance as-
cribed to these past innovations. Since prices now weight information about current
conditions more, they reinforce pessimism/optimism less. As a result, aggregate
output responds less to changes in perceptions in the planner’s solution. Notice
that the planner does not provide any new information to the agents in the econ-
omy but merely changes the weight that agents put on their private information in
their decisions and as a result reduces the information externatlity. In other words,
the planner does not directly influence the filtering problem of agents but can still
construct an improvement in welfare.
Notice, however, that the planner does not entirely eliminate the response of
output to changes in perception about aggregate demand. There are two reasons
for this. First, fluctuations caused by actual changes in productivity are efficient,
and these also affect the perceptions about aggregate demand. Thus, not all fluctu-
ations caused by a change in perceptions are inefficient. Second, the planner faces a
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trade-off in reducing the strategic complementarity. By reducing the strategic com-
plementarity, output on each island responds more to idiosyncratic productivity, as
shown in the first term of equation (2.54). This increases the cross-sectional disper-
sion of output, which reduces welfare. Because of the incomplete markets, a higher
cross-sectional dispersion of output across islands also implies higher dispersion in
consumption which reduces the average welfare in the economy. The planner’s ob-
jective is concave, and thus, he prefers to equate marginal utilities across islands.
Angeletos and La’O (2008) conduct a normative analysis of their setup under
dispersed information and conclude that the decentralized economy is constrained
efficient. This is not the case here. The primary reason for this difference is that in
the current setup, agents are allowed to learn from endogenous sources of information
such as prices. Note that the forecast errors embedded in prices arise due to the
agents assigning relatively less importance to their private signals. Since the planner
can influence the weights agents assign to their various sources of information, the
planner can actually control the informational content of prices and reduce the size
of the forecast error.
The other difference between the current setup and Angeletos and La’O (2008)
is that the fluctuations in their model are driven by noise in exogenous signals.
As was discussed in the previous sections, the importance of these noise shocks
is greatly diminished when agents can learn from endogenous price signals such as
rental rates. In fact, the “non-fundamental” volatility in the current model is driven
by endogenous price signals which are informationally noisy. This “noise” in prices is
caused by the endogenously generated forecast errors. Since “noise” in this setup is
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an outcome of the model rather than a primitive, this implies policy can be directed
to influence the extent of noise.19
2.5.1 Implementing the Efficient Allocations using Fiscal Policy
This subsection shows how the efficient allocation can be implemented by a
policy-maker by using taxes and subsidies contingent only on aggregates that are
observed by everyone in the economy. The key ingredient in this implementation
is that agents in the economy are forward-looking and the planner can use state-
contingent subsidies and taxes to affect the weights that agents place on public and
private information in their decisions. In particular, a policy-maker can implement
the Pigouvian tax on the use of public information by instituting a countercyclical
sales subsidy contingent on the realization of aggregate output (which is publicly
observed in this economy). Thus, the policy-maker need not possess an informational
advantage over the private sector to implement a tax/subsidy to achieve the efficient
allocation.
To implement the efficient allocation in the decentralized economy, the planner
has access to a payroll tax/subsidy, τht , and a proportional sales subsidy, τ
s
t at his
disposal. In addition I assume that the authority has access to a uniform lump-sum
tax to balance the budget. Lump sum taxes are not of consequence in this setup as
policy only works through the anticipatory effects of the distortionary taxes as will
be seen below. Allowing for lump sum taxes is common in the normative literature
19This stands in contrast to a scenario where the noise is a primitive of the model. In the latter,
policy obviously cannot affect the level of noise.
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on informational frictions (See Angeletos and La’O (2010)). Taxes are collected
at the end of the post-production stage and the government is restricted to run a
balanced budget. Since the tax authority has at most the same information as the
private sector, these tax rates depend only on quantities which are publicly observed.
I assume that these taxes are functions of the realization of aggregate output, which
is observed by all agents at the end of the post-production stage. More precisely, I
assume that the (deviation from steady state values of) tax/ subsidy rates take on
the following form:




where φs and φh are constants. φs < 0 implies that the sales subsidy co-varies
negatively with output. φh > 0 implies that the payroll tax co-varies positively with
output. The problem of household i and firm i in the presence of taxes is presented
in Appendix B.4.
By restricting taxes/subsidies to depend only on publicly available informa-
tion, I am implicitly assuming that taxes are uniform across islands. Given these
uniform taxes, the tax authority cannot hope to address all the concerns of the
planner in implementing the efficient allocation. To implement a set of efficient al-
locations, the tax authority must would need to have access to island-specific taxes
and subsidies which depend on information available on that island. In this paper,
I focus on the former case and leave the latter for future research.
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Given the tax system, the optimal decisions of firm i can be summarized by:
Ĥi,t =
[1 + (θ − 1)φs − αφh − θ(1− α)φh]Ei,tŶt
1 + ν(α + θ(1− α)
+
(θ − 1)ẑi,t
1 + ν(α + θ(1− α)
. . .
− α(θ − 1)r̂t
1 + ν(α + θ(1− α)
(2.58)
Ĵi,t =
{(1 + ν)[1 + (θ − 1)φs]− (1− α)(θ − 1)φh}Ei,tŶt
1 + ν(α + θ(1− α)
+
(θ − 1)(1 + ν)ẑi,t
1 + ν(α + θ(1− α)
. . .
− [1− α + θ(α + ν)]r̂t
1 + ν(α + θ(1− α)
(2.59)
The output of firm i is given by:
Ŷi,t =
(1 + αν)[1− φs(θ − 1)]− θ(1− α)φh
1 + ν(α + θ(1− α)
Ei,tŶt +
θ(1 + ν)
1 + ν(α + θ(1− α)
ẑi,t . . .
− αθ(1 + ν))
1 + ν(α + θ(1− α)
r̂t (2.60)
Notice that φs and φh affect the degree of strategic complementary by affecting how
firms respond to a change in perception about aggregate demand. Aggregate output
in this economy is given by:
Ŷt =
θ(1 + ν)
1− α + θ(α + ν)
zt +
αθ(1 + ν)







(1− α)(1 + θ(φs − φh)− φs)
1− α + θ(α + ν)
EtŶt (2.61)
Notice that by appropriately choosing φs and φh, the tax authority can reduce the
response of output to changes in perceptions. By setting φs and φh appropriately,
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the planner can equate the elasticity of output with respect to changes in perception
about aggregate demand in equations (2.55) and (2.61).
Given that the tax authority is constrained to only make taxes contingent on
a linear function of output, it cannot affect the responsiveness of output to actual
productivity and capital to match those from the planner’s problem. However, as
was noted earlier, the planner increases the sensitivity of output to actual changes
in productivity, but these changes aren’t very large. Many different configurations
of (φs, φh) can be used to reduce the responsiveness of output to changes in average
perceptions. The two most obvious candidates being setting one of the two to zero.
Setting φh = 0, given the calibration of the model, φs = −0.09 which implies that
the sales subsidy is countercyclical and that the payroll tax does not vary with the
cycle. The other preferred alternative is to set φs = 0 and to use the payroll tax.
This yields φh = 0.08 which implies a procyclical payroll tax and an acyclical sales
subsidy. This second option is more in line with the old Keynesian prescription of a
counter-cyclical fiscal policy through a pro-cyclical payroll tax. Simulations of the
model confirm that this indeed increases welfare and reduces the volatility of output
fluctuations.
To see why a countercyclical subsidy can implement the Pigouvian tax consider
the following. The reason recessions were protracted was because each firm was
unwilling to act on positive private information as it was worried that the others
did not share the same positive news. Strategic complementarity in a firm’s output
decision implies that it loses profits by producing a quantity very different from
other firms. If a firm expects others to produce low output, it too reduces its output.
119
Further, as was explained earlier, this causes prices to not reflect information about
improving conditions and thus extends and deepens recessions. The countercyclical
sales subsidy protects a firm against this very contingency. If a firm acts on its
positive private information and produces more while others do not respond, the
sales subsidy makes up for the firm’s lost profits from not coordinating. As a result,
the sales subsidy reduces the reliance of a firm’s payoffs to the decisions of other
firms. In particular, it reduces the effective degree of strategic complementarity in
a firm’s output decision.
With a lower effective degree of strategic complementarity, each firm has a
smaller incentive to coordinate and hence has an incentive to react more to its pri-
vate information. In other words, each firm reduces the weight it puts on public
information and increases the weight it puts on private information in their deci-
sion making process. Since decisions now reflect newer information, so do prices
and hence there is more “production of information” which reduces the effect of
pessimism and optimism on output fluctuations. Thus, even without directly pro-
viding new information to the agents, the policy maker has the ability to reduce
the inefficiently large volatility and persistence. Note that the policy of providing
a counter-cyclical sales subsidy to firms operates only because agents are forward
looking and change their behavior in anticipation of events in the future. This is
reminiscent of the results in King (1982) and Weiss (1980) who demonstrated that
policy can be used to affect the informational content of prices in models of monetary
policy where agents learn from commonly observed prices.
Notice that the policy analysis assumed uniform taxation across islands. More
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generally, taxes/ subsidies could be tailored to local conditions. Allowing taxes and
subsidies to be based on island specific information could reduce the tension in the
planner’s decision which forces him to accommodate some sentiment-driven fluctua-
tions, i.e. the planner is unable to entirely eliminate the presence of sentiment-driven
fluctuations. By conditioning on local characteristics, the planner has another tool
to control the cross-sectional dispersion of output which can allow him to further
reduce aggregate fluctuations arising from sentiments without imposing further wel-
fare losses that are due to increased cross-sectional variance across islands. This is
left for future research.
2.6 Concluding Remarks
This paper argues that in economies with incomplete markets, dispersed in-
formation in the presence of strategic complementarities results in agents having
to predict the information that others possess. I highlight that the information
inefficiency of the pricing system may result in excessively volatile and persistent
fluctuations. In particular, if agents infer the perceptions of others from an infor-
mationally inefficient pricing system, they form forecast errors which are correlated.
These correlated forecast errors play the role of pessimism and optimism and inter-
act with production and investment decisions of firms and households to generate
unconditionally more volatile and persistent swings in output.
Allowing agents to learn from prices reduces the impact of pure noise shocks
in driving fluctuations in the economy. However, dispersed information causes more
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pronounced booms and recessions in response to productivity shocks. These fluctu-
ations are inefficient and can be thought of as being amplified by non-fundamental
forces such as pessimism and optimism.
In addition to the positive implications of dispersed information, I also conduct
a normative analysis which shows that the decentralized economy is characterized by
inefficient volatility and persistence of output in response to shocks. Countercyclical
fiscal policy can be used to remedy these inefficient fluctuations. However, this
analysis assumed that the planner can credibly commit to policies. As is well known
from work by Svensson and Woodford (2004) and others, that time consistency is
an issue in the choice of policy with forward looking agents in environments of
incomplete information. Finding a time-consistent implementation is much harder
in the current setup and is left for future work.
The current paper presents a tractable method of solving business cycle models
with heterogeneous beliefs. The basic structure of this model shows that even the
simplest business cycle models can become very complicated when agents are allowed
to have different beliefs. Future work in this area involves exploring the implications
of dispersed beliefs in more sophisticated models with asset markets and how this
affects the business cycle through the financing decisions of firms. Another avenue of
future research is to explore non-linear solutions to the current problem as the linear
methods used in this paper impose symmetry on the model. Applying non-linear
methods will allow an exploration of whether information dispersion itself changes
over the business cycle.
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Chapter A: Appendix for Chapter 1
A.1 Proofs
A.1.1 Existence of a constant equilibrium nominal interest rate
Let R(t) = R, then, by definition





































A.1.2 Proof of Lemma 1
The Full-Information case is when Fm = Fz = 0. All firms adjust prices in
response to all shocks at every instant. Plugging in equations (4) - (9) and imposing












































Each firm sets Pi(t) so as to maximize (A.1.1):


























so that the initial constant term goes to 1. Thus,







Taking logs on both sides
lnP fi (t) = ζ lnZi(t) + r lnP
f (t) + (1− r) lnM(t) (A.1.2)
where ζ = −1




A.1.3 Proof of Proposition 1
Subtract µt from both sides of equation (A.1.2) to get
lnP fi (t)− µt = ζ[lnZi(t)− 0] + r[lnP f (t)− µt] + (1− r)[lnM(t)− µt]
which implies
P̂ fi (t) = ζẐi(t) + rP̂
f (t) + (1− r)M̂(t) (A.1.3)
where the hats imply deviations from the symmetric steady state equilibrium.












around any symmetric equilibrium. Thus, integrating equation (A.1.3) over i ∈ [0, 1]
yields:
P̂ f (t) =
∫ 1
0




f (t) + (1− r)M̂(t)
= rP̂ f (t) + (1− r)M̂(t)
which implies
P̂ f (t) = M̂(t)
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A.1.4 Proof of Lemma 2





gt(τ)dW (τ) + ht(τ)t




[1− r + rgt(τ)]dW (τ) + (1− r)µt+ rht(τ)t
Note that
E{p∗(t) | Iτ̂m} = σm
∫ τ̂m
−∞
[1− r + rgt(τ)]dW (τ) + (1− r)µt+ rht(τ)t
and
E{zi(t) | I iτ̂z} = zi(τ̂z)e
−η(t−τ̂z)




[1− r + rgt(τ)]dW (τ) + (1− r)µt+ rht(τ)t+ ζzi(τ̂z)e−η(t−τ̂z)
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[1− Γmt (τ)][1− r + rgt(τ)]dW (τ) + (1− r)µt+ rht(τ)t
Using the method of undetermined coefficients yields
gt(τ) =
[1− Γat (τ)](1− r)
1− r + rΓat (τ)





(1− r)(1− Γmt (τ))
1− r + rΓmt (τ)
dW (τ) + µt




([1− Γat (τ)]1− r)
1− r + rΓat (τ)
dW (τ) + rµt+ (1− r)σm
∫ t
−∞





1− r + rΓat (τ)
dW (τ) + µt
The next claim follows from the fact that W (t) is a standard Brownian motion.
A.1.5 Proof of Proposition 2
The problem of finding the optimal planning horizon about the aggregate state
can be reformulated with the time since when last information was acquired. Define
δm = t− τ̂m and δz = t− τ̂z as the time since firm i last acquired information about
the aggregate state and about the idiosyncratic state respectively. Thus, the two
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The solution to the first Bellman equation is characterized by the optimal planning
horizon (for aggregate money shocks) T ∗m, iff t > s+ T
∗
m. The first order conditions
with respect to δ̂m for the problem described in equation (A.1.4), using the fact that
the optimal horizon is T ∗m, we can write
L1(T
∗










Following equations (A.1.6) and (A.1.7), in equilibrium since Tm = T
∗
m, it must







































dΘ = σ2m(1− r)2T ∗m
δ
T ∗m − rδ
which can be used to write
L1(T
∗
m)− L1(δ) = (1− r)T ∗m
T ∗m − δ
T ∗m − rδ
Therefore, T ∗m is implicitly defined by
Fm(σm, r, Cm, T ∗m) = 0
where
Fm(σm, r, Cm, Tm) = σ2mTm
∫ Tm
0










T ∗m − s





(T ∗m − rs)2
ds > 0 for 0 < r < 1




A.1.6 Derivation of the Phillips Curve
To estimate the Phillips curve, I use a discrete time approximation to the prob-
lem. In the staggered equilibrium, a particular firm i which last updated information
at date τ , at time t wants to set the (log) price
pi(t; τ) = Eτ [p(t) + (1− r)y(t)]
where Fτ denotes the forecast of the (log) target price at time t based on information
as of time τ . Eτp(t) is the expected log price at t as of τ and Eτy(t) is the expected
output gap (in percentages) as at t as of τ .
Since in the staggered symmetric equilibrium, a constant fraction 1
T
of firms update
their information every period, at time t, no firm has information older than t−T−1,
where T is the optimal planning horizon( that was determined as an equilibrium
object). Thus, a mass 1
T
of firms have information which is current as of date
s ∈ [t − T + 1, t] . Thus, the aggregate (log) price at time t is the average of the
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Et−1−s{p(t− 1) + (1− r)y(t− 1)}
T
(A.1.9)
Subtract equation (A.1.8) from (A.1.9) to get equation (1.32) minus the measure-
ment error:
π(t) =





Et−s−1{π(t) + (1− r)∆y(t)}
T




A.2.1 Estimation of the SIPC







(1− λ)jEt−1−j[πt + (1− r)∆yt]
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where 1− λ is the exogenously specified rate of arrival of new information and also
corresponds to the fraction of firms receiving new information every period. It is
necessary to truncate the number of lagged variables as estimating an equation with
infinite regressors is not feasible. However, the determination of the number of lags
to be included is not supported by any economic theory or restriction from within
the model. Additionally, truncation introduces another error term which is usually
correlated with the regressors, causing estimates to be generally inconsistent. [See
Coibion (2010) for a more detailed discussion on this inconsistency]
The setup in the present paper presents a slightly modified approach which lets
one circumvent these problems. Given that each firm updates its information every
T quarters, in a staggered setting, a fraction 1
T
of firms update their information each
period. This implies that, at any date t, there is no firm that has information older
than vintage t− T . This makes the optimal choice of lags equal to T . This forms a
long run identifying restriction ensuring that monetary policy is neutral in the long
run. Since all firms know about any changes to monetary policy prior to t−T+1, the
aggregate price has responded proportionally to those changes in policy and hence
there is no effect on output anymore. The standard SIPC imposes a different long
run identifying restriction to ensure long run neutrality: limt→∞ λ(1− λ)t = 0. This
restriction in the standard SIPC implies that all firms receive new information at
least asymptotically. However, this long run restriction does not provide a criterion
for picking the number of lags to be used in the estimation.
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A.2.1.1 Maximum Likelihood Estimation












where εt ∼ N(0, σ2) is a measurement error i.i.d across time. The parameter space
is defined as follows
Θ = {(T, r, σ) | T ∈ {2, 3, 4}, r ∈ R, σ ∈ R+}
I estimate the parameters using Maximum Likelihood estimation. The Likelihood



















To test Proposition 5, I estimate the model over two subsamples. Thus, the
model to be estimated is






























To implement the Likelihood ratio test I calculate the maximized log likelihood of
the restricted model where I restrict Tpre ≤ Tpost and the unrestricted model where
Tpre and Tpost are left unrestricted. The test statistic takes the following form
LR = −2 [lnL(restricted)− lnL(unrestricted)]
which is distributed as a χ2 with 1 degree of freedom. The critical values for 1% is
6.6349, 5% is 3.8415 and for 10% is 2.7055.
For the first breakpoint, with the median forecasts, the test statistic is 10.386
and the null can be rejected with 99% confidence.; with mean forecasts, the test
statistic is 4.6132 and the null can be rejected with 95% confidence.
For the second breakpoint, with the median forecasts, the test statistic is
10.386 and the null can be rejected with 99% confidence.; with mean forecasts, the
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test statistic is 4.6132 and the null can be rejected with 95% confidence.
135
Chapter B: Appendix for Chapter 2
B.1 Steady State
This section defines the undistorted and the distorted steady states:
B.1.1 Distorted Steady State of the Economy
I focus on the non-stochastic steady state with a degenerate distribution cap-
ital. The non negativity constraint on capital is assumed to be slack in steady.
There is no uncertainty about fundamentals in steady state and thus all islands
are symmetrically informed about the true state of the economy. Thus, the steady
state of the dispersed information economy corresponds to the one for the symmetric
136
information case. The steady state can be characterized as follows:
zi = 1 , ∀i (B.1.1)
ei = 0 , ∀i (B.1.2)




− 1 + δ (B.1.4)


























































































B.1.2 Undistorted Steady State of the Economy
zi = 1 , ∀i (B.1.10)
ei = 0 , ∀i (B.1.11)




− 1 + δ (B.1.13)
αY = rK (B.1.14)
(1− α)Y = ΨH1+ν (B.1.15)
Y = KαN1−α (B.1.16)
Ci = C = Y − δK (B.1.17)
B.2 Log-Linearized Economy
This section provides the log-linearized version of the economy defined in the
main body of the paper. The log-linearization is arou+nd the non-stochastic steady
state defined in Appendix B.1.
B.2.1 Shocks
The log-linearized shock processes are as follows:
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Productivity The productivity on island i can be expressed as
ẑi,t = ẑt + ei,t (B.2.1)
where
ẑt = ρz ẑt−1 + vt (B.2.2)
Shock to the supply of Capital The supply shock ζt ∼ N(0, σ2ζ ) is i.i.d across time.
B.2.2 Households
The log-linearized form of household i’s problem can be written as


























. Equation (B.2.3) is the labor supply, while equation
(B.2.4) is the bond and capital Euler equations, and equation (B.2.5) is the bud-
get constraint. Equations (B.2.4),(B.2.5) and (B.2.10) can be solved to yield the
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following capital accumulation decisions:
∆K̂i,t+1 = −
αβν(θ − 1)ΨH1+ν


















αν(1− β)(θ − 1)ΨH1+ν



































Labor and capital demand for firm i is given by
L̂i,t =
θ − 1
1 + ν[α + θ(1− α)]
ẑi,t −
α(θ − 1)




1 + ν[α + θ(1− α)]
Ei,tŶt (B.2.7)
Ĵi,t =
(θ − 1)(1 + ν)
1 + ν[α + θ(1− α)]
ẑi,t −
1− α + θ(α + ν)




1 + ν[α + θ(1− α)]
Ei,tŶt (B.2.8)
The output of firm i is given by:
Ŷi,t =
θ(1 + ν)
1 + ν[α + θ(1− α)]
ẑi,t −
αθ(1 + ν)








B.2.4.1 Labor Market Equilibrium
Since labor is immobile across islands, the labor market on each island has to
clear in equilibrium. Firm i internalizes that the household i has an upward sloping
labor supply curve when choosing how much labor to hire. Equilibrium employment
N̂i,t is given by:
N̂i,t =
θ − 1
1 + ν[α + θ(1− α)]
ẑi,t −
α(θ − 1)




1 + ν[α + θ(1− α)]
Ei,tŶt (B.2.10)
and the wage on island i is given by:
ω̂i,t =
ν(θ − 1)
1 + ν[α + θ(1− α)]
ẑi,t −
αν(θ − 1)




1 + ν[α + θ(1− α)]
Ei,tŶt (B.2.11)
Aggregate employment is given by:
N̂t =
θ − 1
1 + ν[α + θ(1− α)]
ẑt −
α(θ − 1)




1 + ν[α + θ(1− α)]
EtŶt (B.2.12)
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B.2.4.2 Capital Market Equilibrium
Total demand for capital is given by
Ĵt =
(θ − 1)(1 + ν)
1 + ν[α + θ(1− α)]
ẑt −
1− α + θ(α + ν)




1 + ν[α + θ(1− α)]
EtŶt (B.2.13)
Aggregating equation (B.2.6)yields the law of motion of aggregate capital stock:


























Market clearing at time t requires that the rental rate r̂t equate K̂t and Ĵt :
r̂t =
(θ − 1)(1 + ν)
1− α + θ(α + ν)
ẑt −
1 + ν[α + θ(1− α)]




1− α + θ(α + ν)
EtŶt (B.2.15)
B.2.4.3 Goods Market Equilibrium
Total ouptut is calculated by aggregating the output of all the firms.
Ŷt =
θ(1 + ν)
1 + ν[α + θ(1− α)]
ẑt −
αθ(1 + ν)








Assume that aggregate capital evolves according to the following law of motion:
K̂t+1 = Kv(L)vt +Ku(L)ut +Kζ(L)ζt (B.2.17)
where Kv(L),Ku(L) and Kζ(L) are analytic over the complex disk of radius
√
β.
Given the guesses above, the rental rate and aggregate output can be expressed as:
r̂t =
[
(θ − 1)(1 + ν)
1− α + θ(α + ν)
1
1− ρzL
− 1 + ν[α + θ(1− α)]
1− α + θ(α + ν)
LKv(L) . . .
+
1 + ν





−1 + ν[α + θ(1− α)]
1− α + θ(α + ν)
LKu(L) . . .
+
1 + ν





−1 + ν[α + θ(1− α)]
1− α + θ(α + ν)
(LKζ(L) + 1) . . .
+
1 + ν


































These equations are then collected into equation (2.47). As was discussed in the
main text, equation (2.47) does not constitute a fundamental Wold representation,
and must be transformed into one so that it can be used to forecast the future values
of the fundamentals. This is carried out using Blaschke matrices. Using Blaschke
matrices, one can construct an observationally equivalent Wold representation of
equation (2.47). Following the methodology in Rozanov (1967), the observationally
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equivalent fundamental Wold representation can be written as:
xi,t =M∗(L)ξ∗i,t (B.2.20)
where M∗(L) = M(L)WB(L), ε∗i,t = B(L−1)′W ′εi,t, WW ′ = I and B(L) is a
Blaschke matrix with a pole at infinity.
By construction, Det[M∗(z)] 6= 0, ∀ |z| < 1. Hence, ε∗i,t is fundamental for
xi,t. {ξ∗i,t−j}∞j=0 and {xi,t} span the same space, i.e. agent i can recover ξ∗i,t by
observing all past and current realizations of signals xi,t. Note that ξ
∗
i,t is comprised
of linear combinations of past and current realizations of the true shocks to the
economy. Agent i cannot back out the true current state of the economy, however,
he can infer a linear combination of todays shocks and shocks from previous periods.
Using this fundamental representation, I then use the Wiener Kolmogrov forecasting














































where ei is a 4× 1 selection vector with 1 in the i-th position and 0 in all others.
Next, I plug these into equations (B.2.14) and (2.44) and match the z-transforms
of the lag polynomials {Kj(L),Yj(L)}. Finally, the lag polynomials {Kj(L),Yj(L)}
are not analytic inside the disc at one point. I set {Kj(β),Yj(β)} to remove these
singularites. This completes the solution.
B.3 Symmetric Information Economy
B.3.1 Housheholds
Households and firms on each island have symmetric information both within
and across islands. Agents can observe all the shocks. Thus, in this section, all
agents in the economy have the same information set and also do not need to filter
the true fundamentals from market signals which implies the following:




E[· | Ii,t]di = E[· | It] = Et[·]
Thus, the equations describing the symmetric information model are the same equa-
tions as in Appendix B.2, setting Ei,t = Et, ∀i ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, the key equations
which describe the decisions of agents are as follows.
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The decisions of the household on island i can be expressed as:
νĤi,t = ω̂i,t (B.3.1)
K̂i,t+1 = K̂i,t −
αβΨν(θ − 1)H1+ν







αν(1− β)(θ − 1)ΨH1+ν

















































Equation (B.3.1) is the labor supply, equation (B.3.2) is the savings decision, and
equation (B.3.3) is the budget constraint.
B.3.2 Firms
The labor and capital demand for firm i is given by
L̂i,t =
θ − 1
1 + ν[α + θ(1− α)]
ẑi,t −
α(θ − 1)




1 + ν[α + θ(1− α)]
Ŷt (B.3.4)
Ĵi,t =
(θ − 1)(1 + ν)
1 + ν[α + θ(1− α)]
ẑi,t −
1− α + θ(α + ν)




1 + ν[α + θ(1− α)]
Ŷt (B.3.5)
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The output of firm i is given by:
Ŷi,t =
θ(1 + ν)
1 + ν[α + θ(1− α)]
ẑi,t −
αθ(1 + ν)




1 + ν[α + θ(1− α)]
Ŷt (B.3.6)
B.3.3 Market Clearing
B.3.3.1 Labor Market Equilibrium
Since labor is immobile across islands, the labor market on each island has to
clear in equilibrium. Employment N̂i,t is chosen by firm i taking the labor supply
function as given. Equilibrium employment N̂i,t is given by:
N̂i,t =
θ − 1
1 + ν[α + θ(1− α)]
ẑi,t −
α(θ − 1)




1 + ν[α + θ(1− α)]
Ŷt (B.3.7)
The wage on each island is given by:
ω̂i,t =
ν(θ − 1)
1 + ν[α + θ(1− α)]
ẑi,t −
αν(θ − 1)




1 + ν[α + θ(1− α)]
Ŷt (B.3.8)
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Aggregate employment is given by:
N̂t =
θ − 1
1 + ν[α + θ(1− α)]
ẑt −
α(θ − 1)




1 + ν[α + θ(1− α)]
Ŷt (B.3.9)
B.3.3.2 Capital Market Equilibrium








The law of motion of aggregate capital can be found by aggregating equation (B.3.2):
K̂t+1 = K̂t −
αβΨν(θ − 1)H1+ν







αν(1− β)(θ − 1)ΨH1+ν










































(K̂t + ζt) (B.3.12)
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B.3.3.3 Goods Market Equilibrium







(K̂t + ζt) (B.3.13)
B.3.4 Solution
As specified in the main text, I look for the unique equilibrium in which
all island specific variables lie in Hβt (εi) the aggregate quantities and prices lie in
the space Hβt (ε), i.e.all island i specific prices and quantities at time t are time-
independent beta-summable linear functions of current and past realizations of
shocks {vt−s, ei,t−s, ζt−s}∞s=0. As a consequence, all aggregate variables at time t
are time independent beta-summable linear combinations of the current and past
realizations of the sequence of shocks {vt−s, ζt−s}∞s=0. I use the method of undeter-
mined coefficients to compute the equilibrium.
Conjecture that the the law of motion of aggregate capital is given by:
K̂t+1 = λkK̂t + λk,z ẑt + λk,ζζt (B.3.14)
where λk <
√
β so as to restrict the solution to Hβt (ε). Plugging in equations
(B.3.12) - (B.3.14) into equation (B.3.11) and matching coefficients on Kt, zt and ζt
yields a system of equations in λk, λk,z and λk,ζ . The system is not presented in the
text because it is intractably large to format. The system is quadratic in λk, and
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conditioning on λk, the system is linear in λk,z and λk,ζ . I choose the the solution
of λk such that it lies in the disk of radius
√
β. Given the calibration, there is only
one solution satisfying this requirement. Thus, the equilibrium is unique.
B.4 Policy
The planner chooses the sequences {{Ci,t, Hi,t, Ki,t+1, Ji,t}i∈[0,1]}∞t=0 to maxi-
mize the average welfare in the economy. It is not straight-forward to think of a
welfare criteria in an environment with heterogeneous beliefs. I use the The pol-
icymaker is restricted to respect the beliefs of the household on each island and
thus maximizes the sum of expected utilities for the household on each island where
the expected utility on each island is calculated with respect to the beliefs on that

























































(1 + ν)Ci,t −ΨH1+νi,t

























(1 + ν)Ci,t −ΨH1+νi,t


















(1 + ν)Ci,t −ΨH1+νi,t
(1 + ν)Ci,t+1 −ΨH1+νi,t+1
(1 + rt+1 − δ)
]
= 1,∀i (B.4.6)
To decentralize the efficient allocations, the planner can use taxes and subsides to
affect the decisions of households and firms. Taxes and subsidies are only functions













Ci,t +Ki,t+1 = ωi,tHi,t + (1 + rt − δ)Ki,t + (1− τπt )Πi,t
151







(1 + ν)Ci,t −ΨH1+νi,t
(1 + ν)Ci,t+1 −ΨH1+νi,t+1
(1 + rt+1 − δ)
}
(B.4.8)
















θ − (1 + τht )ΨH1+νi,t − rtJi,t
}
The tax authority is given the following instruments: a proportional sales subsidy τ st ,
a proportional payroll tax τht , a tax on dividends τ
π
t . Note that these taxes/subsidies
are uniform across islands. Respecting the informational constraints requires these
taxes to be contingent on quantities which are common knowledge. Aggregate out-
put is observed at the end of the period and I assume that taxes/subsidies only
depend on the realization of aggregate output. More precisely,





where τ̃ st is the deviation of the sales subsidy from its steady state value of
1
θ−1 .
Similarly, define the deviation of the payroll subsidy from steady state by τ̃ht from








The lump sum tax every period ensures that the budget is balanced.
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